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GENDER INTEGRATION ON U.S. NAVY SUBMARINES: VIEWS 





This project is an ethnographic case study documenting the experiences of the first group 
of women integrated into the United States Submarine Force. The study seeks to: 1) 
document the process through which each of the women was selected and became a 
submariner; 2) identify hindering and supporting issues and concerns (e.g., life-work 
balance, job-role expectations, and career development); 3) describe the organizational 
culture and cultural change drivers; 4) identify and describe how the women’s 
experiences affected both their professional and personal lives; and 5) identify the 
benefits of gender integration for the submarine force as expressed by the women 
integrated. 
The methodology included a combination of qualitative research methods from 
ethnographic and case studies. Data was collected and analyzed for themes in order to 
answer the research questions. Fifteen female submarine officers, including 11 from the 
first group integrated, were interviewed using semi-structured questions during January–
May 2015. The responses were recorded and transcribed. The interviews focused on the 
following themes: general experience, supporting and hindering factors, submarine 
culture effects, personal and professional impacts, and benefits.  
This project creates an organized, qualitative data set detailing first-person 
accounts of a momentous occurrence in U.S. Navy history. This is a rich source of 
information that can be used in future studies to explore gender integration and 
organizational culture generally or more specifically aboard Navy submarines. 
Additionally, the preliminary analysis establishes a baseline for continued study of initial 
integration on submarines. The authors provide recommendations for further research to 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2010, Defense Secretary Robert Gates notified Congress of the 
Navy’s intent to remove the ban on women serving on submarines (The Associated Press, 
2010), essentially launching the Women in Submarines program. At the time of the 
announcement, and with congressional approval, news organizations reported “the 
Navy’s historic decision to allow women to serve on board submarines, opening the deep 
seas to one of the final frontiers for women in the U.S. military” (Williams, 2010). By the 
fall of 2011, the first 24 female officers reported for duty on four submarines, two on 
each U.S. coast, amid both controversy and support.  
The present study seeks to collect and document the experiences and views of the 
first women assigned to serve on U.S. Navy submarines. The resulting information is 
then assessed to gain an initial impression of the landmark event. Ultimately, it is hoped 
that the information gathered here can assist future research and analysis, while archiving 
the personal impressions, perceptions, and experiences of those who participated in the 
historically significant move toward complete gender integration of the U.S. Navy.  
Historical background provides documentary evidence of the expansion of 
women’s roles and the need for inclusion in the nation’s armed forces. Gender 
integration, besides addressing social and organizational change, affects the military’s 
ability to recruit, train, assign, and retain the most qualified people available for its very 
specialized occupations. The case of submarine service is no exception, as the Navy 
seeks to recruit the most highly qualified individuals for voluntary service. Role 
expansion offers greater flexibility to meet the Navy’s needs, while providing greater 
career opportunities for its servicewomen.  
Although the present research uses a mixed-methods approach, it is perhaps best 
described as an auto-ethnographic case analysis. The ethnographic approach employed 
here takes into account the culture of the Navy and Submarine Force, while collecting 
raw data for future analysis. Previous studies have attempted to build statistical models 
based on surface fleet data to forecast female sustainability in the submarine fleet, yet 
 2 
these studies do not account for the actual experiences and lessons learned thus far. The 
present study hopes to supplement and strengthen previous work by documenting and 
assessing the actual experiences of female submarine officers. The authors’ intent is to 
use these first-hand experiences to identify themes and lessons learned that would benefit 
gender integration processes and policies in the Submarine Force and other areas 
throughout the Navy. 
The primary goal of this research is to document and determine how the first 
women integrated on submarines describe their experiences. Additionally, the individual 
stories of participants should highlight important issues associated with the integration 
process and provide further insight on how organizational culture and individual 
commands can affect the process. This information on experiences, while offering a rich 
data set for the future study of submarine culture, may eventually result in improvements 
to integration policies, programs, and practices more generally, including other roles not 
traditionally filled by women in the U.S. Navy or other military services. 
The next chapter presents a background review describing women’s historical 
roles in the U.S. military, highlighting some of the possible motivations behind their 
service in relation to social norms. The focus is on policy changes, since they help to 
explain the movement toward integrating women on submarines and its current status. A 
chapter on research methods follows, including a description of the present study’s 
approach and data sources. Subsequently, case summaries and analysis are used to 
identify themes and short narratives from the data set. The final chapter presents a 
summary of conclusions, implications, and recommendations for further research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The present study looks at integrating women within only a fraction of the U.S. 
military, the Navy’s Submarine Force. This chapter provides historical context on gender 
integration across the services, including the various barriers and evolving opportunities 
for women to participate in combat. First, women’s early history in the military is 
explored to understand the path toward their expanded role in traditionally male military 
occupations and some of the motivations for eliminating gender barriers. This is followed 
by a brief account of women’s service in the U.S. Navy, highlighting breakthroughs for 
women in the surface and aviation communities that eventually led to integration on 
submarines. Finally, a chronology of gender integration on submarines sets the stage for 
the self-reported stories of women who first served on these underwater platforms.  
A. WOMEN IN THE U.S. MILITARY 
Women have been involved in military affairs as far back as history has provided 
documentary evidence, yet their positions have changed significantly over time and 
continue to evolve even today. Women’s roles have been limited largely by societal 
norms. At the same time, military necessity, along with shifting societal norms, has 
propelled the expanding role of women throughout the nation’s armed forces. This 
section discusses chronologically significant challenges in the nation’s history that have 
gradually opened the doors to military service for women. This background shows how 
women’s opportunities and responsibilities for defending the nation have increased with a 
corresponding change in their acceptance as more equal partners with their male 
counterparts. History also suggests that women’s underlying motives for participating in 
the military have stayed relatively constant and similar to those of men.  
1. Early America 
During the American Revolution, women played essential roles as nurses, service 
providers, and camp followers; in some cases, women even stood and fought on the front 
lines. For example, in 1776, Margaret Cochran Corbin assumed her husband’s duties 
after his death at Fort Washington, New York and fought for General George 
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Washington’s fledgling nation. Corbin was permanently disabled in service, receiving a 
military pension until her death. In 1778, during the New Jersey Campaign, Mary Ludwig 
Hays assumed the role of her artilleryman husband after he was wounded at the Battle of 
Monmouth, leaving her water pitcher for a gun barrel to support the Colonialists. Later 
known as Molly Pitcher, or Captain Molly, Hays also eventually received a pension for 
her service. These are only two limited accounts of women whose situations were vastly 
greater than typical roles of an 18th-century woman (Courtney, 1999; Holm, 1982, pp. 3–
5). Though their support was limited to unusual circumstances, these women were not 
considered part of the military effort and transitioned back to domesticity. 
2. The American Civil War 
An unprecedented number of women served on both sides of the American Civil 
War in a multitude of roles. Most of these women were nurses or vivandieres (a European 
word for a woman who supplied food and water for soldiers), yet there were a number of 
female patriots who served in a more active role on the battlefield. Women serving as 
“daughters of the regiment,” although intended to play an ornamental role to inspire 
units, performed duties ranging from nursing to carbine-toting sharpshooter. A third, less 
well-known, group served as soldiers by disguising themselves as men (Hall, 1994). 
These three roles of nurse, inspiring supporter, and soldier are interesting because they 
developed military positions for women that still exist today.   
Although many social norms and restrictions were superseded by the needs of the 
war, women who were nurses experienced the least societal difficulty in supporting the 
war. These women likely had a number of reasons for serving as caregivers, perhaps a 
combination of nationalism, moral scruples, and an adventurous spirit (Hall, 1994). 
Medical field leaders, such as Clara Barton and Dr. Mary Walker, supported the Union 
Army at great personal cost. Better known for establishing the first National Cemetery at 
Arlington, Virginia and organizing the American Red Cross, Barton was a vital force 
behind the Union Army’s medical equipment and supplies. Walker gave up her medical 
practice to be a nurse, which was a more socially-accepted position for a woman. These 
and other inspired women improved healthcare, not just military ministrations and 
 5 
positions, in sanitation and organizational standards. Though the Army gladly accepted 
the nursing contributions by women, it did not maintain female nurses after the end of the 
war. The nursing efforts of women did, however, permanently create a vocation for 
female military support during future conflicts (Holm, 1982, pp. 7–8). 
Daughters of the regiment and other women who went with soldiers into battle 
filled a number of roles, but were closer to harm’s way and often an active participant in 
combat. These women typically had a profound sense of duty and patriotism and 
bypassed social norms and military bans, called in early references, “half-soldier 
heroines” (Hall, 1994). The cases of Kady Brownell and Marie Tebe at the 1st Bull Run, 
and the cases of Belle Reynolds, Betsy Sullivan, and Bettie Taylor Philips at the Battle of 
Shiloh, show a range of participation. Some women were enthusiastic motivators for 
soldiers to press on, others were vulnerable to cannons and bullets as they administered to 
soldiers on the battlefield, and some were forced into imprisonment after bearing arms or 
spying on the enemy. These women, forced back into societal constraints after the war, 
were more than supporters and caregivers; they proved their ability to be both women and 
patriotic soldiers. 
Women who disguised themselves as men to participate are perhaps the most 
extreme example of women’s early efforts to support the war. The masculine facade 
seems to imply an additional trait to their motives for serving. These women wanted to 
make an impact without consideration given to their gender, which many women in 
today’s military still state as their goal according to this research. Two of the better-
known examples are Loreta Janeta Velazquez and Sara Emma Edmonds, known in their 
male roles as Harry T. Buford and Franklin Thompson, respectively. Though on opposite 
sides of the war, both women, from very different backgrounds, resorted to the same 
technique of living their lives as men to actually fight in the war.   
3. The World Wars 
During World War I, gender integration occurred more out of necessity than from 
social or political change, but role expansion continued. The war required the United 
States to develop a larger conventional force, prompting the military to modernize. War 
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support requirements included clerical, communication and medical expertise. Many 
nations, including the U.S., needed women for wartime work. In response, over 12,000 
women worked in Yeomen (F) positions as clerks, recruiters, and naval intelligence 
specialists. Approximately 20,000 women joined the Army and Navy Nurse Corps. 
Although not in conformance with the social norms of a woman’s role at the time, the 
U.S. Naval Act of 1916 contained recruitment language that was not gender-specific. The 
Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, allowed this neutral interpretation to fill some 
of the personnel shortfalls, leading to additional policy changes to support women’s 
inclusion in the war. The roles of women during World War I were limited by keeping 
them separated from the regular Navy and Army, at times “to avoid the questions of 
officer status and equal recognition of their abilities” (Hacker & Vining, 2012, pp. 213–
214). 
After the First World War, the United States, among other nations, made 
constitutional changes that permitted women to vote and have citizenship rights. 
Emergencies at a domestic level spur social changes. Scholars suggest that the new 
opportunities for economic independence and demonstration of new competencies, 
provided in the scope of both World Wars, transformed the boundaries of women’s 
position in society (Carreiras, 2006, p. 10). Despite these changes, some traditionalists, 
many with political influence, firmly believed “the Armed Forces were no place for 
women and that military service would somehow destroy their futures as ‘good mothers’” 
(Holm, 1982, p. 26). As Holm (1982) also observes, these sentiments began to change 
with World War II.  
Due to the expansive theater setting of the Second World War and its intertwining 
effect on civilian and military society, the United States saw even greater shortages in 
manpower on the front lines, spurring more women to fill administrative and medical 
roles for the military that would free up men for transfer. Seeing the successful efforts of 
women’s support in other nations and the permeating effects of war in every facet of 
daily life, the Department of Defense (DOD) permitted approximately 350,000 women to 
provide temporary support services. This included the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps 
(WAAC) and Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) after the 
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attack on Pearl Harbor (Harrell, Beckett, Chien, & Sollinger, 2002). The perspective on 
women in military service at this point was based on three fundamental themes: women’s 
positions were temporary, only for the duration of the wars; direct support positions were 
the only occupations permitted for women; and women were expected to return to the 
standard role of domesticity that society anticipated after a conflict (Carreiras, 2006, pp. 
9–10). 
The military’s gender neutrality efforts after Victory in Europe Day shifted 
legislatively, yet prohibitions persisted on women’s role in the military, just as they still 
existed in society. As Carreiras (2006) writes, “Women failed to capitalize on wartime 
disruptions of gender norms in order to improve their social position” (p. 11). This 
perceived failure appears contrary to the Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, which 
gave women permanent status in the Armed Forces, though percentage caps limited their 
numbers and roles. For example, women were restricted to two percent in the enlisted 
ranks and ten percent in the officer corps, and were subject to rank and age limitations 
(Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, 1948). The Act, known more recognizably as 
the Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, authorized “the enlistment and 
appointment of women in the Regular Air Force, Regular Navy and Marine Corps, and in 
the Reserve components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps” (Women’s 
Armed Services Integration Act, 1948).  
Women who served in the military throughout the Second World War, although 
not assigned to combat, appear to have initiated a thought process that rested on their 
admirable service in professional roles. General Eisenhower and other military leaders 
saw a permanent role for women in service. Congressman Carl Vinson proposed the 
permanent assignment of a Women’s Reserve in March 1946 (Holm, 1982), and 
Congress placed women permanently in military legislative doctrine with Public Law 80–
625. This law was codified in United States Code 10 Section 6015, including the 
prohibition from “duty on vessels or in aircraft that are engaged in combat missions” or 
assignment “to other than temporary duty on vessels of the Navy except hospital ships, 
transports, and vessels of a similar classification not expected to be assigned combat 
missions” (Women’s Armed Services Integration Act, 1948). 
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4. Korea and Vietnam 
The Korean and Vietnam Wars were the next to demand more forces than were 
available at the time, necessitating an expansion of female troop support. Only 22,000 
women were serving on active duty at the beginning of the Korean War, less than one 
percent of the Armed Forces. Within a year of the fighting, numbers had grown, yet only 
totaled a little over one percent (Holm, 1982, pp. 149–150). More significantly, for the 
first time in American history, women were called involuntarily to military service along 
with the men (Soderbergh, 1994). Although Congress lifted the two percent ceiling on 
women, this had minimal effect on women’s involvement. Numbers were needed not 
only in the healthcare profession but also to help offset the large requirements placed on 
the draft. Recruiting efforts increased significantly, but the results were not exceptional 
and Secretary of Defense George Marshall created the Defense Advisory Committee on 
Women in the Services (DACOWITS) to assist recruiting goals (Holm, 1982). 
Vietnam similarly required increased numbers of women, but additionally had to 
address the issue of permitting them to serve in combat zones. Armed forces leaders, 
though reticent to permit any woman into a combat zone, knew that nurses were 
desperately needed. By the end of the withdrawal, approximately 7,500 women had 
served in Southeast Asia (Holm, 1982, p. 206). These women successfully pushed social 
and military norms to prove both functionality and capability for women’s uniformed 
service in a combat zone. Many argue that these successes prompted the policy changes 
of the post-Vietnam period. 
B. WOMEN OF THE MODERN U.S. NAVY 
Although the types of women’s service positions remained relatively unchanged, 
legislation continued to push for change during and after the Vietnam War. The rise of 
feminism and the women’s rights movement gained additional traction for legislative 
advancements in the military’s gender equality. This section focuses on these changes 
with respect to the United States Navy. As policies and public attitudes shifted toward 
increased gender inclusion, the Navy integrated women into shipboard roles that 
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generated additional direct combat concerns. These changes led to the phased integration 
in the surface warfare and aviation communities.  
1. The Post-War Period 
Initial policies during the post-Vietnam period addressed the temporary nature of 
women’s military service through Section 6015, but women were still unable to compete 
equally with their male counterparts. Feminism was on the rise, focused on obtaining 
equal pay and benefits already in progress within the military (Holm, 1982). Congress 
removed the restrictions on women’s rank and the cumbersome percentage caps by 1967 
(Iskra, 2003), but more significant change was required after President Nixon enacted 
Public Law 92–129 on September 28, 1971. This law committed the nation to an All-
Volunteer Force (Rostker, 2006), and all services acted to make improvements to military 
life in response. The Chief of Naval Operations, however, additionally aimed to make the 
Navy more satisfying and attractive for minorities. Admiral Zumwalt may not have 
intended to target women specifically, but his position appeared to be gender-neutral and 
was to “throw over-board once and for all the Navy’s silent but real and persistent 
discrimination against minorities” (Rostker, 2006, p. 60). Despite women not being 
previously considered in most, if any, manpower studies, the Central All-Volunteer Force 
Task Force began studying women’s roles in the military and their utilization following 
the push to pass an Equal Rights Amendment on March 22, 1972.  
The Navy agreed to exceed the task force’s initial manning goals and anticipated 
doubling the number of women. From 1972 to 1976, active-duty women grew from 1.9 
percent to 4.6 percent across the forces (Rostker, 2006, pp. 175–176, 201, 324). 
Collegiate Reserve Officer Training Corps and limited ships were opened to women in 
1972, and women began entering the nation’s service academies in 1976 (Harrell et al., 
2002). At the same time, court cases in the 1970s tackled benefits such as dependent 
assistance, motherhood needs and service on sea-going, non-combatant vessels (Iskra, 
2003).  
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2. Navy Breakthroughs of the 1970s and 1980s 
A pivotal milestone for the Navy came in 1972 with Memorandum #5 of the 
Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Women (mostly known as the WAVE director). 
Navy Captain Robin L. Quigley effectively abolished the support structure for women in 
the Navy and focused women toward using traditional Bureau of Naval Personnel offices 
for assistance and management. Some reacted with disdain to her move, but it permitted 
the organization to adjust under the supportive management of Admiral Zumwalt, who 
had already made, and continued to make, supportive changes for women (Holm, 1982). 
By 1975, significant portions of career fields had opened to women, with approximately 
80 percent without barriers in the Navy (Rostker, 2006). 
The Navy’s pilot program for ship assignment that began in 1972 on the USS 
SANCTUARY for assigning women at sea proved the efficacy of single sea duty 
assignments. Unfortunately, the women in the program did not fully grasp their career 
limitations until assignment. As a result, in 1976, six women filed a claim against Section 
6015, claiming their exclusion based on gender was unconstitutional. After two years in 
federal court, Judge John Sirica ruled in favor of the women, stating,  
The core protection afforded by the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment is that laws favoring members of one gender and 
disadvantaging members of the other be reasonably and, beyond that, 
substantially related to the achievement of some important objective. 
(Iskra, 2003, p. 14) 
The lawsuit set a precedent for women’s future role opportunities, and the Navy 
requested from Congress that women’s restriction from ships be amended under the 
Navy’s literal interpretation of Title 10 USC Section 6015 (Iskra, 2003). By 1977, 
congressional hearings began, and by March 1978, Congress was considering H.R. 7431, 
which would allow greater utilization of women on ships. Related congressional hearings 
ended with tabling a total repeal of Section 6015. Further, the Chief of Naval Personnel 
endorsed changes in law to: (1) maximize force readiness by manpower efficiency, (2) 
address the decline of the eligible male population, (3) address society’s increasing 
requirements for more female opportunity in career building within the Navy, (4) provide 
equal training and opportunity for Naval Academy graduates, and (5) bring the Navy up 
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to speed with the current positions allowed civilians (Iskra, 2003). During hearings 
regarding Section 6015, women’s service in direct combat was discussed throughout, and 
it became a main theme of discourse. Other themes repeated, as expected, on physical 
strength, modifications to facilities, and the morale of men subjected to serving with 
women. Almost as foreshadowing, in closing remarks, questions arose on the status of 
submarines as a potential gateway for women in combat. The Navy’s answer was limited 
to temporary duty allowances (Iskra, 2003).  
3. Direct Ground Combat 
Concerns over women’s role in combat continued to persist despite the significant 
strides of the military services and society toward removing other barriers to women. 
Most notably, the DOD Task Force on Women in the Military endorsed the “risk rule” in 
1988. This rule prevented the opening of occupations to women if the position placed 
them at risk of exposure to direct fighting, capture, or hostile fire (Harrell & Miller, 
1997). The rule proved difficult to interpret, legally and officially, and led to a policy for 
phased assimilation in aviation, combatant craft, and ground billets, respectively. From 
these measures, two women commanded units in 1989 in Panama; two years later, the 
Persian Gulf War found many women assigned to combat zones. This, along with the 
unanticipated ships with women that sailed through dangerous waters in the Gulf, would 
be a major motivator for change in 1993 (Iskra, 2003). 
Based on evidence of women’s effectiveness in combatant situations, the Navy 
recommended repealing the combat exclusion laws in 1993. Women in Operation Desert 
Storm performed well, their assignment to non-combatant ships and aviation roles did not 
exclude them from combat zones, and social acceptance of women in combat seemed to 
be increasing at home. Congress supported the Navy’s recommendations to open combat 
aviation positions in April 1993, and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed integration 
of women on all ships not engaged in direct conflict missions (Harrell et al., 2002). 
Congress further established a guide for women’s integration on Navy combatant ships in 
November 1993 through Public Law 103–160, the Defense Authorization Bill of FY 
1994. Repealing the combatant exclusion law and passing the National Defense 
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Authorization Act for FY 1994 required the Secretary of Defense to: ensure that 
qualification for and continuance in occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of 
a common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender; refrain from the 
use of gender quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; 
and refrain from changing occupational standards simply to increase or decrease the 
number of women in an occupational career field (Harrell et al., 2002). 
At this point, women constituted approximately 12 percent of Navy personnel, 
and the repeal would now permit them to serve in combat aircraft and ships (Iskra, 2006). 
By January 1994, Les Aspin overturned the “risk rule” and redefined “direct ground 
combat” for clarification. The role was defined as:   
Engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served 
weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of 
direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct ground 
combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while locating and 
closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect. 
(Harrell & Miller, 1997, pp. 2–3) 
The only restrictions permitted by Secretary Aspin were: positions where the cost 
of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive, doctrinal roles that 
would require physical collocation with direct combat units prohibited for women, long 
range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Forces missions, and jobs with 
physical requirements that would necessarily exclude the vast majority of female 
servicemembers (Burrelli, 2013). 
With Operations Iraqi Freedom, Desert Shield, and Desert Storm in the early 
1990s and 2000s, specific wartime situations further affected the roles performed by 
women. Although perhaps more applicable to the operational environment of the Army, 
the shift from previous, conventionally-fought wars to more asymmetric conflict blurred 
the lines between direct ground combat and support roles, thus bringing to question the 
1994 definition of direct combat (Burrelli, 2013). Ineffective policy definitions not only 
hampered discussions of direct combat, but also the matter of integrating women on 
submarines. 
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C. WOMEN ON SUBMARINES  
The integration progress described above cleared many impediments for women’s 
inclusion in the submarine service. Previous literature reveals a variety of cultural, social, 
structural, and political concerns that were overcome historically by the military’s need 
for manpower during conflict. More recent apprehensions revolved around de facto 
changes in the combat exclusion laws of the 1990s and women’s safety, yet many of the 
topics were still a reflection of previous resistance to gender integration. Arguably, the 
major catalyst for change came from societal expectations of diversity and equity and the 
military’s ability to achieve those objectives. Today, after significant policy and 
operational changes, female officers are serving on many submarines and efforts are 
underway to do the same for enlisted personnel.  
1. Legislative Changes and Service Efforts 
On December 5, 1991, legislators repealed the limitations of servicewomen’s 
assignment to combat aircraft and naval vessels (National Defense Authorization Act, 
1991), yet barriers to women still existed for submarines. Despite the limits on undersea 
service, the law further established a Presidential Commission on the Assignment of 
Women in the Armed Forces to provide recommendations for policy changes. In 
November 1992, the commission’s report recommended a repeal to existing laws and 
policy modifications for women to serve on more combatant vessels, but still not on 
submarines (United States, 1992, p. 72). Legislative changes in 1993 included expanded 
gender-neutrality requirements and gave timelines for congressional notice on proposed 
changes for female assignments in combat roles. Specifically, the Defense Secretary had 
to notify the Armed Services Committees, of both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, at least 90 days prior to any policy change in ground-combat assignments, but 
only 30 days before opening a combatant vessel or platform to women (NDAA, 1994). 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed a new assignment policy for women on October 
1, 1994 that reduced restrictions, but submarine service was still excluded. Women could 
not be assigned to platforms that were cost prohibitive in berthing and privacy changes, 
as confirmed by Service Secretary attestation (Burrelli, 2013).  
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The new program for the Virginia-class submarine began in the 1990s, part of 
President Clinton’s military reform (Defense Industry Daily, 2008). Since berthing and 
privacy costs were the only lawful concern barring women’s integration, many advocates 
of removing barriers to women questioned the Virginia-class design. DACOWITS 
specifically questioned the gender neutrality of the new class. While not released to the 
public until 1999, the CNO provided the Submarine Assignment Policy Assessment (SAIC 
Report) to DACOWITS in 1995. The report concluded that: 
Introducing women into submarines is less a question of whether they can 
do the day-to-day work than it is a question of whether the added 
complications of a mixed-gender crew will undermine the operational 
effectiveness of the ship. Therefore, the focus should not be on women, 
per se, but on the ramifications of having mixed-gender crews in the 
unique submarine environment. (SAIC, 1995) 
Overall, the report states that a mixed-gender crew would “complicate submarine 
life,” but generally observes that tradeoffs would have to be considered with respect to 
costs and effectiveness, which is consistent with previous efforts toward integration. In 
the spring of 1999, DACOWITS recommended that: (1) future submarines have mixed-
gender accommodations and (2) female officers be assigned to Trident ballistic missile 
submarines (SSBNs) (Donnelly, 2007).  
 Despite pressure from two Navy Secretaries, John Dalton and his successor, 
Richard Danzig, the CNO provided additional material that questioned the validity of 
assigning women to submarines. DACOWITS continued to disregard the Navy’s 
summarized reports and slides, clinging to its call for Virginia-class redesign and 
assignment of female officers, despite a few tangible points. Some of the more notable 
contentions, summarized below and based on Donnelly (2007), are: 
• Alterations could reduce already below-standard conditions 
• Separate women’s quarters would not only cramp living conditions, but 
fail required habitability standards  
• Virginia-class submarines were purposed to be smaller, which would 
require operational equipment removal to permit female inclusion  
• Current assignment of female officers would create a two-tiered 
community 
• Medical emergencies with respect to women’s health are too great a 
concern and could impose too great a risk 
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Realizing that advocates of women on submarines could lead to changes in the 
Navy without congressional approval or oversight on platforms, Representative Roscoe 
Bartlett (R-MD) quickly sponsored passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 
FY 2001. The law prevented the Navy from spending money on reconfiguration or design 
efforts for female integration on submarines without approval from Congress, and the 
Navy did not ask for any hearings to air the matter or express concern (Donnelly, 2007). 
In 2006, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen made several 
statements regarding gender diversity and provided favorable prospects for women’s 
integration into the submarine community. Whether this was due to the increased 
numbers of educated women in technical fields, recruitment deficiencies, social 
pressures, or moral justifications, both he and the Naval Academy Superintendent 
increased gender quota goals (Donnelly, 2007). In a speech presented at the Naval Air 
Systems Command Total Force Diversity Day, Mullen stressed his position on diversity: 
“Having the cultural skills, having the diverse backgrounds in order to literally achieve 
our mission is really critical. That is why [diversity] is a strategic imperative” (Chief of 
Naval Operations Public Affairs, 2006). The CNO encouraged healthy discussions among 
service members to create opportunities for all, not just some, and proposed that these 
improvements would better address the challenges from globalization and the war on 
terror. 
The next publicized push for women in submarines began in September 2009, 
with Defense Secretary Robert Gates informing Congress of the decision to pursue 
gender integration on submarines (Rickard, 2010). Admiral Mullen, as Chairman for the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his reconfirmation hearings before Congress, stated that he 
wanted to see the policy changed. At the same time, CNO Admiral Gary Roughead 
described himself as “comfortable” with force integration, but voiced concern over the 
retention rate for women. With a gap of almost 15 percent in retention rates between men 
and women, according to Admiral Roughead, the Navy had to address the possibility of 
submarine force shortfalls (Tyson, 2009). Despite sustainability concerns, officials noted 
that “there is a vast pool of talent that we are neglecting in our recruiting efforts” 
(Rickard, 2010). On February 19, 2010, the Secretary of Defense gave formal notice to 
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Congress of a plan to gender-integrate submarines. On April 29, 2010, Navy Secretary 
Ray Mabus and the CNO moved forward with the announced plans to integrate female 
officers on submarines (CMR, 2010). 
2. Officer Accessions 
The National Defense Authorization Act (2011) for fiscal year 2011 mandated a 
review of the following by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Navy: 
Laws, policies, and regulations, including the collocation policy, that may 
restrict the service of female members of the Armed Forces to determine 
whether changes in such laws, policies, and regulations are needed to 
ensure that female members have equitable opportunities to compete and 
excel in the Armed Forces. (NDAA, 2011) 
In May of 2011, the Chief of Naval Operations responded with OPNAVINST 
1300.17B: Assignment of Women in the Navy (see Appendix A). This instruction 
includes updated procedures pertinent to integrating women officers on submarines. 
Specifically, the instruction states the following: 
• Women would be assigned to designated submarines 
• Only female officers could be assigned to submarines 
• All women would be detailed to submarines per standard detailing 
procedures (Chief of Naval Operations, 2011) 
Rear Admiral Barry Bruner led efforts as the head of the task force for the 
Women in Submarines program. He announced the progression that would begin with 24 
women, three women for each crew, assigned to two submarines on each U.S. coast, in 
Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington (Bynum, 2010). The plan assigned women 
in the nuclear pipeline to Nuclear Power School in July of 2010 with fleet placement 
toward the fall of 2011. Two nuclear-trained officers and one surface-qualified Supply 
Officer would complete the female complement per crew (Bruner, 2010). Chief of Naval 
Operations policy coincided with the initial women’s training at Submarine Officer Basic 
Course (SOBC). 
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 The first female cohort of ship’s company submariners graduated from SOBC in 
November of 2011 and was dispersed to their respective crews assignments (McDermott, 
2011). Submarines included the ballistic missile submarines USS WYOMING (SSBN 
742) and USS MAINE (SSBN 741), and the guided missile submarines USS GEORGIA 
(SSGN 729) and USS OHIO (SSGN 726). Guidelines for embarkation can be reviewed in 
Appendix B (Commander, Submarine Group 10, 2011). In June of 2012, the first female 
Supply Officer qualified in submarines (Commander, Submarine Group 9 Public Affairs, 
2012) and was followed by the first qualified female submarine officers on December 5, 
2012 (Browning, 2012). By the next announcement of officer integration in 2013, there 
were six integrated submarines (12 crews) with 43 women assigned. This next step 
pertained to the inclusion of officers on two Virginia-class submarines, the USS 
VIRGINIA (SSN 774) and USS MINNESOTA (SSN 783) (Defense Media Activity-
Navy, 2013). 
3. Enlisted Inclusion 
Submarine integration plans began with female officers on two submarine 
platforms in 2011, expanded to its third platform in early 2015, and continues to increase 
efforts by platform and in future design considerations. Simultaneously, the force is 
executing plans to include enlisted women (Johnson, 2013). As reported by RAND, there 
were a total of 13,000 closed enlisted positions for submarine-related occupations, 12, 
128 on submarines themselves (Miller, Kavanagh, Lytell, Jennings, & Martin, 2012, p. 
45). In 2013, the submarine force announced its final integration phase to remove the 
barrier for enlisted women (Fellman, 2013). 
Planning for enlisted integration began similarly to that used for integrating 
officers. Rear Admiral Ken Perry, as head of Submarine Group 2, was assigned to lead 
the study and looked toward a 2016 goal for selective boat assignment (Fellman, 2013). 
The Enlisted Women in Submarines Task Force (EWSTF) originated in May 2013 and 
would produce the plan that identified and addressed complications, while promoting an 
appropriate female submariner population. In looking for a sustainable and actionable 
plan, the Director of Military Personnel Plans and Policy sponsored a study by the Center 
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for Naval Analyses to provide analytical support to the EWSTF (Parcell & Parvin, 2014). 
Rear Admiral Perry also looked to the first cadre of integrated officers to receive candid 
face-to-face feedback on their own experiences with the process and their thoughts on 
enlisted integration (K. Ellis, personal communication, 21 April 2015). A plan was 
submitted to Congress on July 18, 2014 that stated intentions to modify seven Ohio-class 
submarines and build Virginia-class submarines for gender-neutral assignment (Somers, 
2014). Recent 2015 Naval administrative message traffic (see Appendix C) shows the 
approved plan for enlisted integration. As of April 2015, selection is ongoing (Moran, 
2015).  
D. CONCLUSION 
Women in the United States Submarine Service, while a relatively minute portion 
of the historical integration process, are an interesting and valuable case study for gender 
integration in other contexts. The setting for women’s integration on submarines may be 
difficult for those not familiar with the organization to understand. A chronology of 
events leading up to integration in this “final frontier” of Navy service is thus helpful in 
illuminating legal and cultural impediments as well as the process by which barriers were 
ultimately lifted. Foremost among the forces of change was the military’s need for 
personnel; necessity, as they say, and particularly during periods of war, is the mother of 
invention. Further, the context of historical progression and the manner in which 
women’s role in the military has expanded shows how shifting societal norms and 
attitudes gradually propelled the military toward policy changes. Additionally, the sea-
going, forward-positioned nature of the Navy allowed women of the surface and aviation 
communities to become the pioneers of gender integration, thereby easing traditional 
military thinking while opening doors for more complete gender-neutrality. History, 
however, can only provide a basic understanding of the process leading to women’s 
integration on submarines. The next chapter analyzes the additional contributions of 




A qualitative research design was used to address the questions posed in this 
study. It is neither a traditional ethnography nor a case study, but rather a combination of 
research methods from both traditions. More specifically, the ethnographic techniques 
fall into a sub-genre of organizational ethnography commonly referred to as 
autoethnography. This chapter will examine the framework of the research design to 
include a discussion of its appropriateness, it will provide a description of the setting and 
background of the research participants, it will include a discussion of the data collection 
methods as well as the roles and impacts of the researchers as data collectors, and it will 
conclude with an evaluation of the limitations and strengths of the study method.  
A. QUALITATIVE DESIGN AND RELEVANCE 
The primary objective of this project was to create an organized, qualitative data 
set detailing first-person accounts of a momentous occurrence in the U.S. Navy, the 
initial integration of women into the submarine force, which would provide deep insight 
into this complex social group process. In designing the study the researchers focused on 
the goal of documenting the lived experiences of the first female submariners in such a 
way as to allow meaningful responses to the primary research questions: How would the 
first women to join the submarine force generally describe their integration experience? 
What factors supported or hindered their integration? What was the character of the 
organizational culture and how did it affect their experiences? Have their experiences 
affected them, professionally or personally and, if so, how? What do the participants see 
as the benefits of their integration? Such questions cannot be answered by collecting the 
type of quantitative data that can be analyzed using statistical methods. Complex social 
processes are shaped by the beliefs, attitudes, and experiences of the people involved 
(Marie, 2001), and by the culture of the parent organization. Description and 
interpretation of the process can only occur in context, and any effort to share what is 
learned requires an understanding of the context (Marie, 2001). Answering these 
questions requires a deeper understanding of this process and research methods that can 
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reproduce experiences that embody cultural meanings and understandings that operate in 
the “real” world (Denzin, 1997). These needs are best met with qualitative research 
designs. Bogdan and Biklen (2007) provide the following description of qualitative 
research design (as cited in Marie, 2001): 
The data collected have been termed soft, that is, rich in descriptions of 
people, places and conversations, and not easily handled by statistical 
procedures. Research questions…are formulated to investigate topics in all 
of their complexity, in context. While people conducting qualitative 
research may develop a focus as they collect data, they do not approach 
the research with…hypotheses to test. They also are concerned as well 
with understanding behavior from the subject’s own frame of reference.  
In his book Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, John Creswell (1998) offers 
several “compelling reasons” to use a qualitative research approach, which align with the 
structure of this study.  
1. The nature of the research question. In qualitative studies, questions often 
start with how or what and seek to describe what is going on, in contrast to 
quantitative studies that tend to ask why and look for cause-and-effect 
relationships or correlations between variables. 
2. Qualitative studies should be utilized when the topic requires exploration, 
meaning there are not clearly defined variables, and theories to explain 
participant behavior are not currently available and require development. 
3. Qualitative studies are most appropriate when a close-up, detailed view of 
the topic is required to answer the research questions posed. 
4. Qualitative study should be chosen when it is important to observe the 
behavior of participants in their natural setting or in context of the social 
process. 
5. A qualitative approach is appropriate when the presentation of the data 
will often take on a story telling form of narration, or when the writer 
intends to bring him or herself into the study. 
6. Qualitative methods should be used when detailed but unstructured data 
will be collected in the field and data to be analyzed will be in the form of 
text. 
7. Utilize a qualitative approach to emphasize the researcher’s role as an 
active learner who can tell the story from the participant’s view rather than 
as an “expert” who passes judgment.  
Quite similarly, Field and Morse (1996) suggest using qualitative methods when 
little is known about the domain, when the researcher suspects bias to be present in 
current knowledge or theories, or when the research questions pertain to understanding a 
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phenomenon or event about which little is currently known. Each of these describes the 
conditions of this study.  
In summary, a qualitative design was appropriate to document and analyze the 
lived experiences of the subjects in this study. It is most appropriate because of the nature 
of the questions asked, the lack of clearly defined variables, the necessity for contextual 
understanding, the fact that the data is in the form of narrative text, and the researchers’ 
roles as active participants. It enabled a deeper understanding of this complex social 
process from which to evaluate the questions posed and captured invaluable data from 
this one-time, unique social event that can be drawn upon for future studies. 
B. CHOICE OF QUALITATIVE METHODS 
Within the field of qualitative study there are many methodologies or research 
frameworks from which to choose, such as biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, 
ethnography, case study, and many others (Creswell, 1998). The central purpose of the 
research determines the choice of methods (Marie, 2001). For this study, the design 
chosen is best described as a combination of organizational autoethnography, a sub-genre 
of ethnography, and a multiple case study. The following paragraphs depart from the 
high-level discussion of qualitative design to provide a more detailed description of these 
qualitative research traditions. 
1. Ethnography 
A description of autoethnography must start first with an understanding of the 
parent methodology of ethnography. Willis (2007) suggests that ethnography is a broad 
“umbrella term for fieldwork, interviewing, and other means of gathering data in 
authentic (e.g., real-world) environments” (p. 235). Ethnographies provide understanding 
and descriptions of unique cultural or social groups by examining their behavior, social 
interactions, language, customs, and general way of life from the perspective of an active 
participant who is immersed in the group. This is accomplished typically through 
prolonged direct participant observation and individual interviews with the group 
members (Creswell, 1998). Ann Cunliffe (2010) offers perhaps a complete definition of 
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ethnography, encompassing both the mechanics of the design and the edifying intents of 
such studies. 
Ethnography is about understanding human experience—how a particular 
community lives—by studying events, language, rituals, institutions, 
behaviors, artifacts, and interactions. It differs from other approaches to 
research in that it requires immersion and translation. Ethnography is not a 
quick dip into a research site using surveys and interviews, but an 
extended period time in which the ethnographer immerses herself in the 
community she is studying: interacting with community members, 
observing, building relationships, and participating in community life. She 
then has to translate that experience so that it is meaningful to the reader. 
This is not achieved by testing propositions and generating predictive and 
generalizable knowledge...(p. 4–5) 
To dig yet one level deeper, the term organizational ethnography is often used 
when the focus of the study is understanding and describing experiences of individuals 
within the framework of a specific organization. Organizational ethnographies describe 
how people manage and organize themselves to do their daily work and live their daily 
life within the context of their organizational culture (Cunliffe, 2010), or as Alvesson 
(2003) puts it, “what ‘really’ goes in in organizations: how people act, interact, talk and 
accomplish things” (p. 168).  
2. Autoethnography 
The major distinction between a conventional ethnography and autoethnography 
is the fact that the researcher is deeply self-identified as a full member of the group or 
social world being studied; group membership precedes the decision to conduct research 
(Anderson, 2006). In their book Membership Roles in Field Research, Patricia and Peter 
Adler (1987, as cited in Anderson, 2006) refer to these researchers as CMRs, or 
Complete Member Researchers. Group membership can come simply from sharing like 
circumstances, such as a unique medical affliction, where the members share common 
experiences but have little to no other connection, or it may involve more complex social 
or organizational structures and unique sub cultures (Anderson, 2006), as is the case in 
this study. As previously discussed, the traditional ethnographer engages in participant 
observation (Creswell, 1998) within a setting or community that they have entered 
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temporarily, as a stranger (Alvesson, 2003). The researcher must then attempt to 
understand the natives from their point of view, or “break in” (Alvesson, 2003) if you 
will. The autoethnographer, by contrast, not only has “natural access” to the cultural 
setting (Alvesson, 2003, p. 174) but by virtue of being an insider can “draw on personal 
experience, cultural competence, and linguistic resources to frame and shape research in a 
way that an outsider cannot” (Karra & Phillips, 2007, p. 547). Instead of simply 
conducting participant observation, the researcher becomes an observing participant 
(Alvesson, 2003).  
Another key distinction between conventional ethnography and autoethnography 
lies in how the researcher’s role as a group member is revealed in the text. Unlike 
traditional ethnographies where the researcher is revealed as more of a detached observer, 
in autoethnographies the researcher is identified as an active social actor, and it is 
recognized that their own feelings and experiences are not only involved in the way they 
understand and frame the social world being studied but are considered vital for that 
understanding (Anderson, 2006). In many cases autoethnographers may even recount 
their own thoughts and experiences within the text in order to demonstrate their personal 
engagement or illustrate their analytic insights (Anderson, 2006). Atkinson, Coffey, and 
Delamont (2003, as cited in Anderson, 2006) perhaps best summarize this idea: 
[Auto]ethnographers-as-authors frame their accounts with personal 
reflexive views of the self. Their ethnographic data are situated within 
their personal experience and sense making. They themselves form part of 
the representational process in which they are engaging and are part of the 
story they are telling. 
In summary, autoethnography, as defined by Karra and Phillips (2007) is “the 
generation of theoretically relevant descriptions of a group to which one belongs based 
on a structured analysis of one’s experiences and the experiences of others from one’s 
group” (p. 547). Though autoethnography bears many resemblances with its parent genre 
ethnography, the fundamental differences are the inclusion of the researcher as a full 
member of the social group under study and the vital presence of the researcher in the 
text as an active participant in the creation of understanding and knowledge of that group. 
As Reed-Danahay (1997, as cited in Karra & Phillips, 2007) best puts it, “whereas the 
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ethnographer translates a foreign culture for members of his or her own culture, the 
autoethnographer translates ‘home’ culture for audiences of ‘others.’” 
3. Case Study 
The case study research method can be defined as “an examination of a specific 
phenomenon such as a program, an event, a person, a process, an institution, or a social 
group” (Merriam, 1988, as cited in Willis, 2007). At first glance this definition may seem 
no different than the previous description of ethnography and indeed, as Willis (2007) 
points out, case studies are much more similar to ethnographies than dissimilar. The key 
differentiation between case studies and other qualitative methods is that a case study is 
an examination of a bounded system and the object of interest is the case itself (Creswell, 
1998). Merriam (1998) asserts, “the single most defining characteristic of case study 
research lies in delimiting the object of study, the case” (p. 27). While in ethnography 
what is being analyzed for understanding is the sociocultural processes within a group 
(Merriam, 1998), in case studies the focus is to understand the intricacies of the specific 
case itself—a program, an event, an activity, an individual—bounded by time and place 
(Creswell, 1998) and within its own real-life context (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).  
As with ethnographies, there are many variations of case study design. Choice of 
design is based on three major factors: 1) Purpose, that is, whether the intent is to 
describe, interpret, or evaluate a phenomenon (Merriam, 1998); 2) Motivation, be it 
intrinsic or instrumental (Scholz & Tietje, 2002); and 3) Design, whether it is holistic or 
embedded (Yin, 2009). Additionally, case studies may be designed around a single case 
or multiple cases, sometimes referred to as collective case studies (Merriam, 1998).  
Merriam (1998) explains that the purpose of the case study is based on the desired 
end result, or the overall intent of the study. Descriptive studies are designed to do just 
that, describe. They are simply a chronicle of events and not directed by any established 
theories or models. This type of case study often forms a database for future analysis and 
theory building. Interpretive case studies also provide detailed descriptions of the 
phenomenon or event being studied but are designed to illustrate, support or challenge an 
assumption or set of assumptions that were developed prior to the study. The key element 
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of an evaluative case study is that it ends in judgment. These case studies are designed to 
weigh information in order to develop and support a conclusion.  
When investigating the motivation for a case study, the key difference between an 
intrinsic and instrumental study is in the interest that the research or study group has in 
the subject of the study. When the researcher’s interests are in the understanding of the 
case itself, and these interests are of a more nonscientific nature, the researcher is said to 
be intrinsically motivated. If, however, the primary interest for conducting the study is to 
gain knowledge in order to further understanding of something other than the case itself, 
it is considered an instrumental study (Scholz & Tietje, 2002). As Stake (1995) points 
out, intrinsic case studies are rarely chosen; rather, they are given. It is because the 
researcher takes an interest in the case itself that the case gets studied. Conversely, for 
instrumental studies, cases are chosen specifically to answer a separate research question. 
When it comes to the overall design of case studies, Yin (2009) identifies two 
major categories, holistic and embedded; the units of analysis, and what level analysis of 
the data is conducted at, determine the difference. In a holistic study there is only one unit 
and level of analysis, and emphasis is placed on understanding the entire case as a whole. 
In an embedded study there are multiple units and levels of analysis, and attention may be 
given to individual subunits. Additionally, holistic case studies typically involve 
qualitative analysis only, while embedded studies often involve use of various methods, 
both qualitative and quantitative, within the subunits (Scholz & Tietje, 2002).   
The final design characteristic of case studies is the number of separate cases that 
are involved in the overall study. When more than one case is involved that can be 
distinguished as fully separate cases rather than simply subunits, the study is often 
referred to as a multiple case study (Scholz & Tietje, 2002) or collective case study 
(Merriam, 1998). Multiple case studies allow cross-case analysis that is not possible in 
single case studies. Additionally, variations between cases make generalizations or 
theories that can be developed from the data more compelling, especially when the 
number of cases involved is large. For these reasons, the use of multiple cases is often 
used as a strategy to enhance the validity of a study (Merriam, 1998). 
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4. Summary 
The choice of research methodology for this study was a combination of 
organizational autoethnography and multiple case study qualitative traditions. It is an 
ethnography because the study sought to qualitatively understand human experiences 
through the complex social process that was the initial integration of women in the U.S. 
submarine force. It would be considered organizational ethnography because the study 
focuses on experiences within the organizational context of the Navy and the submarine 
community. It is an autoethnography because the researchers were full members of the 
community being studied, one a 15-year career submariner and the other one of the first 
24 females integrated. The study is a case study because it is an examination of a specific 
event, bounded in time and place (Creswell, 1998). As a case study it is descriptive in 
intent because no preexisting theories or models guide it and it provides a detailed 
database of descriptive data that will be useful in future studies. It is intrinsically 
motivated because the object of interest is the case itself, the social process of initial 
integration. It is an embedded study because, while the overall focus is the understanding 
of the integration process in the submarine force as a whole, by examining the 
experiences of individuals as the units of analysis, attention is also given to subunits in 
the form of organizational cultures on board individual submarines. Finally, it is a 
multiple case study because, although the organization in the study is the submarine 
force, each submarine crew has its own unique and individual climate and culture that 
shapes the experiences of its members, which allows differentiation of these experiences 
as fully separate cases within the construct of the whole.  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
1. Study Setting 
A deep understanding of a social process necessarily requires an understanding of 
the setting in which that process occurs (Marie, 2001). The social process under study in 
this case is the initial integration of female officers into submarine crews. Submarine 
crews work in a unique physical and operational environment. Exploration of the 
integration of women into submarine crews, thus, requires an understanding of this 
 27 
unique setting. The following discussion focuses on the physical environment of the 
submarines and the operational, social and psychological environment faced by both male 
and females on submarines.  
a. The Submarine  
The Navy currently operates four classes of submarines. These classes are further 
subdivided based on their function or mission. Three classes, the Los Angeles, Seawolf 
and Virginia classes, are identified as attack submarines or SSNs. The major function of 
attack submarines is to perform seek-and-destroy missions on enemy ships and 
submarines, conduct surveillance and reconnaissance, provide covert troop insertion, and 
conduct mining and anti-mine operations. The fourth class of submarine, the Ohio class, 
was designed for the sole purpose of carrying and launching the Trident submarine 
launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Often referred to as “boomers,” the submarines of the 
Ohio class provide the most survivable leg of the United States’ nuclear triad of SLBMs, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and aircraft-deployed weapons (Woolf, 2015). 
Their sole mission is strategic nuclear deterrence. Recently, four Ohio class submarines 
underwent a conversion process to produce a third submarine mission capability. These 
submarines were modified to now carry up to 154 tactical Tomahawk missiles instead of 
their previous load-out of 24 ballistic missiles. In addition to providing this new cruise 
missile capability, they were also specially modified to carry and deliver teams of Special 
Operations forces covertly. Although they are still part of the Ohio class, these four boats 
were re-designated as guided missile submarines, or SSGNs (Navy Recruiting Command, 
n.d.). 
Because of their specific mission sets, the attack submarine classes and the Ohio 
class subs were designed with significantly different dimensions. Attack submarines are 
smaller and more agile, while the Ohio class boats are much larger and spacious to 
support not only the missile payload they were designed to carry but also extended 
periods at sea without resupply. In terms of berthing and sanitary facilities, no class of 
submarine was designed to support dual-gender crews. The Navy determined that 
because of the greater living space and the layout of officer berthing and sanitary 
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facilities on board Ohio class submarines, however, no significant modifications would 
be necessary in order to support the initial integration plan of three female officers per 
crew (Alliance for National Defense, 2010). For this reason, Navy policy directed that for 
initial integration, females would be assigned to crews on Ohio class submarines, SSBNs 
and SSGNs, only (Commander, Submarine Group 10, 2011).  
Although the Ohio class submarines are substantially larger than attack 
submarines, 560 feet long and 42 feet wide vs. 360 feet long and 33 feet wide for the Los 
Angeles class (U.S. Navy, 2014a; U.S. Navy, 2014c), living space is still very small 
compared to surface ships. Submarines are designed from the start to minimize overall 
size and costs (SAIC, 1995), which necessarily means that internal space is utilized to the 
maximum extent possible. Personnel aboard submarines live and work amongst a myriad 
of complex propulsion, weapons, habitability and other systems, and their associated 
equipment, not to mention the onboard nuclear power plant, often staying submerged for 
months on end. This quote (Gwinn & Tanquin, 1994, as cited in SAIC, 1995) provides a 
concise description of life on board a nuclear submarine: 
A nuclear submarine embodies the highest form of integrated technologies 
in the world—more complex than even space vehicles—and must operate 
in a more hostile environment. U.S. submariners must live and work 
underwater for extended periods, coexisting with a nuclear reactor. 
As space on board is very limited in general, personal space is even scarcer. On 
Ohio class submarines, the majority of the crew berth in the missile compartment, in a 
dozen 9-man bunkrooms between the missile tubes. In these bunkrooms the beds, or 
“racks,” are stacked three high. Each rack is approximately six and a half feet long, one 
and a half feet wide and has eighteen inches of clearance between the mattress and the 
upper bunk or ceiling. Within each bunk is a reading light and an adjustable ventilation 
outlet. When in the rack, privacy is provided by a curtain along the side that may be 
drawn shut. The mattress pan is hinged so it can be lifted to access a storage area 
approximately three inches in depth beneath the mattress. This storage area and a single 
pull out drawer, no larger than your typical filing cabinet drawer, is the extent of each 
enlisted man’s personal storage (SAIC, 1995). All enlisted personnel share two 
 29 
community heads, each with three toilets, four sinks and two showers. At peak times, 
there are often lines to use the heads. 
Although officer berthing is in a different location on the ship, called officer 
country, it offers little more privacy and space than the enlisted berthing. The racks used 
in officer berthing are nearly identical to those in enlisted berthing, but are located in 
shared staterooms that are secured by doors rather than curtains, as is the case for the 
enlisted bunkrooms. The CO and XO each have their own stateroom with a shared head 
containing one shower and one toilet. The remaining officers on board occupy two three-
person staterooms, and three two-person staterooms. There are typically more officers on 
board than available space in the staterooms, so some officers, typically the most junior, 
are assigned berthing in the enlisted bunkrooms.  
In department head and junior officer staterooms, racks are also stacked three 
high as in the enlisted bunkrooms. Staterooms have two shared storage units, each with 
three drawers similar in size to a typical bedroom dresser drawer, a tabletop that folds 
down to provide a surface for use of the laptop that is stored behind it, and two lockers 
above the table, typically used for storage of books and binders. There are also additional 
medium and large-sized community storage lockers, arranged in different configurations 
depending on the stateroom. The members of the stateroom generally decide on division 
of the community storage spaces. With the exception of the CO and XO, the officers all 
share a single head, which has two toilets, two showers, one sink, and a porthole window 
on the main door. 
Aside from personal spaces, nearly all other spaces on board are considered 
operational, with the exception of the mess decks where the crew eats meals, the 
wardroom, which serves as the messing facility for the officers, a small lounge for the 
enlisted crew only, and the officer’s study, a small room that also serves as a ship’s 
publication library. Neither the mess decks nor the wardroom has enough seating to 
accommodate its target population during a meal, meaning there are often long lines or 
skipped meals during meal hours. These spaces are also often utilized for other purposes 
during non-meal hours such as group training sessions or meetings, as is the officer’s 
study. The following are some additional descriptions of the physical submarine 
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environment provided by Science Applications International Corporation in their 1995 
Submarine Assignment Policy Assessment (pp. 18–19):  
• Unlike surface ships, submarines offer no place to be alone, except in the 
bunk with curtain drawn. 
• There are no windows or any connection with the outside—no opportunity 
to walk topside, to look at the ocean, to watch sunrise or sunset; to observe 
weather changes. 
• There is no indication of speed or depth, except for an occasional gauge, a 
sharp turn, or when the ship takes an angle to change depth. Submerged 
the platform is almost always steady.  
• Temperature is constant. 
• Physical proximity to and contact with shipmates is unavoidable and 
frequent. 
• Except for when the mess decks are free, there is virtually no place to sit 
down—except for those standing watch at their equipment. 
Per navy doctrine (Commander, Submarine Group 10, 2011), female officers 
assigned to crews aboard Ohio class submarines were to be given a three-person 
stateroom. This requirement was intended to support the policy that females were to be 
assigned to submarine crews in groups of three, one senior female supply officer and two 
nuclear officers. In practice, however, the number of females onboard at any given time 
varied due to personnel gain and loss timing, and the occasional presence of female riders 
from other crews. When the number of females on board was other than three, personnel 
were shuffled between the two and three-person staterooms to accommodate. Females 
and males were not allowed to berth in the same stateroom, and by policy, female officers 
were required to be assigned to a stateroom that could be secured by a locking door. As a 
result, male officers were often displaced to enlisted berthing. To address the shared head 
situation, integrated crews were required to have a sign manufactured and placed on the 
door that could be flipped around to indicate when the head was in use by a female or a 
male.  
b. The Operational, Social and Physiological Environment 
The typical composition of a crew aboard an Ohio class submarine (SSBNs and 
SSGNs) is 15 officers and 140 enlisted (144 for SSGNs) (U.S. Navy, 2014a; U.S. Navy, 
2014b). The group of officers is often collectively referred to as the “wardroom.” The 
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wardroom consists of the Commanding Officer (CO), the Executive Officer (XO), four 
Department Heads (DH), the Engineer Officer (ENG), the Navigation Officer (NAV), the 
Weapons Officer (WEPS), the Supply Officer who is referred to on submarines as the 
CHOP, and multiple Division Officers (DO). Division Officers are the most junior 
officers, ranging in rank from O-1 to O-3, and are all on their first tour of duty at sea. 
Department Heads are on their second sea tour and are O-3s or O-4s. The XO is typically 
on his third sea duty and is an O-4, although some may advance to O-5 prior to 
completing their tour as XO. The CO of any submarine is overall in charge and has 
successfully completed an XO tour and Prospective CO (PCO) school to qualify for 
command. On SSBNs the CO is an O-5, while on SSGNs the CO is an O-6 who has 
already successfully completed one command tour.  
On both platforms, there are two full and separate crews assigned, designated the 
gold and the blue crews. One crew takes the boat out to sea to conduct its primary 
mission, then returns to homeport or other facility to conduct a maintenance upkeep 
period. During this period, command of the ship is handed over to the other crew, who 
then takes the ship back to sea following the maintenance period, leaving the previous 
crew in port to conduct an off-crew pre-deployment training period (PDTP). The cycle 
then repeats, thus maximizing the operational tempo of the ship. For SSBNs, the typical 
rotation is 77 days at sea and 35 days in port for upkeep (U.S. Navy, 2014a). SSGNs 
maintain a similar schedule, except unlike the SSBNs whose maintenance periods are 
always conducted in homeport, every other upkeep and crew exchange is conducted from 
a forward-deployed U.S. Naval base in either Guam or Diego Garcia.   
The rank and responsibility structure on a submarine crew also serves to define its 
social structure. The crew is divided into three main entities: the wardroom, as previously 
discussed; the Chief Petty Officer (CPO) quarters, consisting of senior enlisted members 
ranked E-7 to E-9; and the junior enlisted personnel ranked E-1 to E-6. The enlisted 
community is further separated into divisions by Navy rating, or job specialty. Enlisted 
members in the Navy are rated based on their specific training and area of expertise. For 
example, nuclear-trained enlisted electricians are rated as Electrician’s Mates, personnel 
trained in nuclear machinery are nuclear Machinist Mates, personnel trained in non-
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nuclear mechanics are rated conventional Machinist Mates, and those trained to operate 
and maintain sonar equipment are Sonar Technicians. Each division of similarly rated 
personnel is responsible for their applicable equipment and associated tasks. Each 
division’s senior E-6, or First Class Petty Officer, is designated as the division’s Leading 
Petty Officer (LPO) and is directly responsible for the day-to-day operations of his 
division and for direction and tracking of all other enlisted division members junior to 
him. Each division also has a senior enlisted CPO of the same rating who is in charge of 
overseeing the division overall, and who serves as the liaison between the command team 
(CO, XO and DHs) for the division. The division LPO is directly answerable to the CPO. 
Additionally, the most senior CPO on board, usually a senior E-8 or E-9, is the Chief of 
the Boat or COB. The COB is the senior enlisted advisor to the CO. The divisions are 
grouped into departments by overall function, which are the responsibility of the 
Department Heads. For example, all engineering divisions are part of the Engineering 
Department, and all divisions associated with the ship’s tactical and weapons systems 
make up the Weapons Department. All Department Heads are directly answerable to the 
CO and XO.  
All junior officers (JO) are also assigned a division and serve as their Division 
Officer. While they have positional authority by title and rank, this authority is very 
limited, and indeed their position in the division is more as a figurehead. The division 
officer works directly alongside their division CPO and their primary responsibility is to 
learn. The secondary responsibility of every division chief is to develop and train junior 
officers. During their time as division officer a JO will learn how to lead a division, how 
to maintain division admin, and generally how to live and operate in the submarine 
environment. A division officer’s Chief Petty Officer is his or her first guide and 
mentor—at least, that is the intent. 
General life on board a submarine is also very different from that aboard other 
Naval vessels. Again, the 1995 Submarine Assignment Policy Assessment by Science 
Applications International Corporation concisely states some of these differences (pp. 
18–19). 
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• The crew stands watch in six-hour shifts. A three-section watch bill 
converts submarine life to an 18-hour day with six hours on watch and the 
remaining twelve hours divided between training, maintenance, 
professional duties, eating and sleeping. 
• The 18-hour rotation means that crew members cannot sleep at the same 
time every day. This disrupts the body’s circadian rhythm.  
• To accommodate watch standing, submarines, like other ships, serve four 
meals a day. To the individual arising from sleep, the next meal may be 
dinner, not breakfast. 
• Drills are all-hands evolutions and handled as actual emergencies. Drills 
are frequently conducted several times each day. This provides further 
disruption to any “normal” routine. 
Communication with family members is via email, but connectivity is not 
constant as on surface ships. Email can only be sent and received when at periscope depth 
(PD), and only then with permission of the CO as it is a time-consuming process, which 
further adds risk to the submarine’s mission and safety. Additionally, no communications 
are private; they are each screened for content that could be detrimental to the mission if 
intercepted, such as elements of the ship’s schedule or mission details. Incoming emails 
are also scanned for any negative personal news that may be deemed distracting to the 
person receiving it, such as deaths or divorces. It then becomes the captain’s decision 
when and how the information will be delivered (SAIC, 1995). In the case of SSBNs, 
crews may be out of communication completely for multiple weeks at a time, as no 
transmissions are allowed when they are on station. 
The final notable element of the submarine cultural environment that deserves 
discussion is the utter dedication to attention to detail, the pursuit of further knowledge 
and the great value placed on competency and self-sufficiency. On board, even the 
manner of speech is governed by the Submarine Doctrine for Interior Communications, 
or Sub IC Manual, in order to ensure quick, concise communications and to eliminate any 
confusions in meaning. This is vigorously enforced by leadership elements when 
personnel use speech not in accordance with the manual. Continual training and 
qualification is a way of life. Individuals are expected to be self-starters, they are 
expected to pull their own weight, and they are expected to seek continual improvement. 
For both officer and enlisted, earning submarine dolphins is the major milestone that 
signifies they are now a full and useful member of the crew. In fact, the culture is such 
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that prior to earning dolphins personnel are often tagged with the label NUB, or Non-
Useful Body. Non-dolphin wearers are often not allowed in recreational spaces such as 
the crew’s lounge, or in the wardroom during a movie; they are often denied dessert 
following a meal; their progress on submarine qualifications is closely tracked and if they 
fall behind a pre-determined progress curve then they are labeled as DINQ, or delinquent, 
and mandatory study hours are assigned. They are ridiculed if there is an impression that 
they are spending too many hours sleeping. Although most evident and worst when a 
submariner is un-qualified, this culture is pervasive on submarine crews and lends little 
forgiveness for incompetence, mistakes and especially lethargy.  
c. Selection  
Because of the unique setting, selection to subs, while remaining completely 
voluntary, is subject to a number of qualification requirements. These requirements are 
delineated in the Naval Military Personnel Manual, article 1306–402: Qualification for 
Assignment to Submarine Duty, which states “Candidates must exhibit the highest 
standards of personal conduct and reliability involving the operation and maintenance of 
submarines” (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2007). This article specifies requirements 
related to minimum time of service, minimum scores required on sections of the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test, age limits, standards related to discipline and 
performance, considerations for prior drug use, and physical and psychological 
requirements, including successful completion of a special submarine duty examination. 
Physical and psychological requirements are outlined in detail in the Manual of 
the Medical Department, U.S. Navy, Chapter 15: Physical Examinations and Standards 
for Enlistment, Commission, and Special Duty. Section 15–106 (Department of the Navy 
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 2014) specifically relates to submarine duty and opens 
with the following statement: 
Submarine duty is characterized by isolation, medical austerity, need for 
reliability, prolonged subsistence in enclosed spaces, exposure to 
atmosphere contaminants, and psychological stress. The purpose of the 
submarine duty standards is to maximize mission capability by ensuring 
the mental and physical readiness of the Submarine Force. 
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This section (Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 2014) 
goes on to describe in detail all of the physical requirements of the examination. The 
general purpose is to identify any medical conditions that may cause an individual to be 
unable to effectively serve onboard a submarine, or which have the potential to disrupt 
submarine operations due to the need to conduct a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) 
because a medical condition cannot be handled with onboard resources.  
Any condition or combination of conditions which may be exacerbated by 
submarine duty or increase potential for MEDEVAC is disqualifying. 
Also, any condition, combination of conditions, or treatment which may 
impair the ability of one to safely and effectively work and live in the 
submarine environment is disqualifying. 
Additionally, section 15-106 (Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and 
Surgery, 2014) says the following regarding assessment of the psychological health of the 
examinee: 
The examiner will pay special attention to the mental status, psychiatric, 
and neurologic components of the examination, and will review the entire 
health record for evidence of past impairment. Specifically, the individual 
will be questioned about difficulty getting along with other personnel, 
history of suicidal or homicidal behavior (ideation, gesture, attempt), and 
anxiety related to tight or closed spaces, nuclear power, or nuclear 
weapons. 
Finally, this section outlines several requirements that are specific to female 
submarine volunteers. Two of these requirements are medical and include a woman’s 
exam within the preceding 12 months. The last female-specific requirement is submission 
of a NAVMED form 6420/2: Health and Reproductive Risk Counseling for Female 
Submariners and Submarine Candidates. This form must be signed by the examinee and 
certifies that they have been advised that: 
• The health and reproductive risks posed to women by the submarine 
environment, if any, are unknown but thought to be small.  
• Research programs have been implemented to detect any risks that may 
exist.  
• To minimize exposure of the fetus to the submarine environment and 
avoid complications of pregnancy at sea, pregnant women are not 
permitted on board submarines at sea. Female submariners are strongly 
encouraged to avoid pregnancy while assigned to submarines. 
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The requirements and minimum standards set forth by these directives are meant 
to serve as a screening process to ensure personnel assigned to submarines are able to 
effectively work in the unique and strenuous conditions imposed by the submarine 
environment.  
2. Study Participants 
Female officers who participated in the initial integration process of the United 
States Submarine Force were asked to voluntarily participate in this study. Though the 
researchers and sponsors of this study desired to maximize participation and ultimately 
preferred total population contributions, operational schedules and numerous other 
complicating factors dictated and limited the availability of women for interviews. Of the 
original 24, 16 were contacted and 11 became participants. Two participants were not in 
the first group of 24, but were among the first women to be integrated onto submarines. 
Finally, two participants were in the second round of integration aboard their submarines, 
meaning they took the place of a transferring officer.  
While the women are from a range of backgrounds, they have similar educational 
experience. A small number (13%), had some prior enlisted background. All of the 
women are college educated, as all Naval officers are required to have, at minimum, a 
bachelor’s degree. Some attended the Naval Academy, others attended a university with 
an embedded Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) command, and others 
obtained a degree prior to applying and being selected for service as a naval officer. 
Approximately two-thirds of the women are nuclear-trained officers (designation 1170 
prior to qualification in submarines and 1120 after qualification), while the remaining 
women selected are Supply Officers (designation 3100). Upon reporting to the 
submarine, nuclear-trained officers had limited prior Navy experience besides their 
nuclear training, while the selected Supply Officers had prior experience serving on 
surface ships, had qualified in at least one warfare community, and were more senior in 
rank. This distinction was intended to provide a mentor/mentee relationship. Initial 
integration required that each submarine crew be assigned two nuclear-trained junior 
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officers and one warfare-qualified supply officer (Commander, Submarine Group 10, 
2011). 
The 1170 designation signifies an unrestricted-line nuclear-trained officer 
currently in training to become a submarine warfare-qualified officer. The unrestricted 
line designation indicates eligibility for future command of a Naval vessel. After 
achieving qualification in submarine warfare, these officers are re-designated 1120. 
Officers with an 1120 designation remain in the nuclear submarine community for over 
20 years of their naval career, but can serve in some non-traditional tours on other ships 
after their first tour. The typical initial progression entails training at Naval Nuclear 
Power Training Command for six months, where they learn reactor theory, fluid 
dynamics, and other engineering-heavy topics in a classroom setting. After passing a 
comprehensive exam, submarine officers attend Prototype for an additional six months, 
where they receive experience with operating systems and standing watch on an 
operational nuclear reactor. A nuclear-trained officer’s first tour of duty is considered the 
division officer tour. Thereafter, if an officer chooses to remain on active service they 
will progress through the positions of department head, executive officer, and eventually 
commanding officer, with shore duty assignments falling between each sea duty tour. 
The 3100 designation signifies a staff corps officer who specializes as a business 
manager for the Navy. Supply Corps personnel provide sustained global logistics to all 
communities of the Navy as well as joint warfighters. The staff corps designation 
indicates that they are not eligible for command of a Naval vessel. The typical tour 
progression begins with training at Navy Supply Corps School for 20 weeks in the Basic 
Qualification Course that covers the major areas of afloat logistics. After graduation, 
supply officers are assigned to their first operational tour, typically on a ship. For their 
second tour, most supply officers serve on shore duty in a fleet logistical support 
concentration area. Prior to serving as a Department Head on an operational platform, 
whether on their first or second sea tour, supply officers return to Navy Supply Corps 
School for five weeks to attend Supply Officer Department Head Course (SODHC) for 
further training. Many of the participants were selected for their ashore and afloat 
experience to assist integration efforts, both in an operational and mentor role. 
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After graduation from their respective pipeline, all officers reporting to 
submarines attend the Submarine Officer Basic Course (SOBC), where they learn about 
sonar, navigation, and periscope skills. At varying points, personnel submit preferences 
for their platform assignment. For female officers in this study, they requested the type of 
platform (SSBN or SSGN) and homeport (Bangor, Washington or Kings Bay, Georgia). 
Male officers currently have more options, as they are able to serve aboard attack 
submarines as well as the Ohio class SSBNs and SSGNs, which opens five additional 
homeport options. The Navy detailing process attempts to assign orders that match up 
with one of each officer’s top three preferences, but this is not always possible. Most 
officers are issued formal orders while in SOBC and upon graduation report immediately 
to their assigned ships for duty as a division officer. The first group of women submitted 
preferences and received orders prior to arriving to SOBC to assist in the integration 
timeline. 
After reporting onboard, nuclear-trained officers must complete at least 12 
months as an engineering division officer, so are assigned as soon as possible to be either 
the Main Propulsion Assistant (MPA) in charge of Machinery Division, the Reactor 
Controls Assistant (RCA) in charge of Reactor Controls Division, the Electrical Assistant 
(EA) in charge of electrical division, or the Chemistry/Radiological Controls Assistant 
(CRA) in charge of the Engineering Laboratory Technician (ELT) Division. After 
attaining all required engineering qualifications including Engineering Officer of the 
Watch (EOOW) and Engineering Duty Officer (EDO) and completing the minimum 12 
months as an engineering duty officer, nuclear-trained officers are then assigned to a new 
division officer position outside of the engineering department, such as the Assistant 
Weapons Officer (AWEPS) in charge of the Missile Technician Division, the 
Communications Officer (COMMO) in charge of the Radio Division, or the Tactical 
Systems Officer (TSO) in charge of the Sonar Technician, Fire Control Technician, and 
Torpedo Divisions. In this capacity, they will finish their 36 months of assigned sea duty. 
Supply Officers are assigned as a department head for the entirety of their tour in charge 
of the Supply Department, which consists of the Culinary Specialist and Logistic 
Specialist divisions. 
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Following their engineering qualifications, nuclear-trained officers must complete 
a series of separate qualifications, often referred to as “forward quals.” These 
qualifications focus on the learning of all non-engineering ship systems, ship handling 
and dynamics, navigation and maritime “rules of the road,” periscope skills, damage 
control, employment of tactical systems, and other skills necessary to qualify as an 
Officer of the Deck (OOD) and Ship’s Duty Officer (SDO). Officer of the Deck is the 
highest position on the at-sea watch team. All other watch stations are subordinate to, and 
must report statuses to and request permissions from, the OOD. The Officer of the Deck 
is ultimately responsible for all evolutions conducted aboard ship during a watch and is 
considered the captain’s direct representative. The OOD gives all helming orders to 
ensure proper navigation of the ship and directly oversees all control room teams, 
including the navigation team, the sonar section, the fire-control party, the radio section 
and the ship’s control party. Ship’s Duty officer is the in-port equivalent to the OOD. 
Upon completion of all engineering and forward qualifications, officers are awarded their 
submarine officer warfare insignia, or “gold dolphins,” signifying they are now a fully 
qualified submarine officer, and their Navy designator is changed to 1120. Earning 
submarine dolphins is often considered the crowning achievement of the division officer 
tour. Qualifications do not end here, however. Each 1120 must also attend Prospective 
Nuclear Engineer Officer (PNEO) school, an additional 3-month training regimen 
concluding with a set of technical interviews at the office of Naval Reactors (NR) in 
Washington, DC, prior to finishing their division officer tour. Following successful 
completion of a rigorous, 8-hour exam and “passing” two out of three interviews at NR, 
they are officially qualified as a Naval Nuclear Engineer and become eligible for 
selection as a submarine department head. Failure to pass PNEO makes a nuclear officer 
ineligible to become a submarine department head, and they will likely not be allowed to 
continue service past their initial commitment without re-designation, which is rare in the 
nuclear community. 
Supply Officers are not required to complete any engineering qualifications but 
they do complete many of the same “forward” qualifications as the nuclear-trained 
officers. They also learn about ships systems, damage control, ship handling and 
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dynamics, navigation, maritime “rules of the road,” and tactical systems, and qualify to 
use the periscope. Some Supply Officers even qualify Surfaced OOD, meaning they are 
qualified by the captain to be overall in charge and give helming orders when the 
submarine is operating on the surface. Most often, Supply Officers qualify and fill the 
role on the watch bill of Diving Officer of the Watch (DOOW). This watch station is the 
overall supervisor for the ship’s control party. This group consists of watch standers that 
operate the submarine control surfaces, which affect course and depth, and a watch 
stander who runs the ballast control panel (BCP). At this panel are the controls for 
numerous ships systems used for ballasting the ship: three separate hydraulic power 
plants, the hovering system, the emergency main ballast tank (EMBT) blow system, the 
ship’s high pressure air system, all ship’s alarms, and many other functions. The DOOW 
is overall in charge of this party and reports directly to the OOD. 
3. Data Collection Procedures 
Data collection in qualitative studies often relies on interviews, observations and 
document review (Merriam, 1998). The data collection method chosen for this study was 
personal interview, and was based first and foremost upon feasibility. Most of the events 
intended for study, the integration of the first group of submarine females, had happened 
in the past, therefore negating the data collection method of extended direct observation, 
which is traditional in ethnographic study. Although additional submarines are still 
currently being integrated for the first time, and these events would most certainly fall 
within the purview of this study, time and operational constraints would not support such 
direct observation. The interview method was appropriate not only because the events to 
be studied occurred in the past and cannot be replicated, but also because it grants access 
to other non-observables such as individual feelings and interpretations (Merriam, 1998). 
As Marie (2001) asserts, “interviews gather data that reflect behavior, attitudes, and 
experiences that take place while the interviewer is not present” (p. 119). Data was also 
gathered through review of the limited available documentation of the process and is 
discussed in Chapter II. 
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The interview method can be broadly divided into two categories, guided and 
open-ended. The type of interview chosen by a researcher is generally based on how 
much knowledge the researcher has about the intended research topic (Field, 1996). An 
interview that is completely open-ended or unstructured is best utilized when the 
researcher knows very little about the topic. The open-ended interview has no 
predetermined structure or question set, because the researcher does not know what 
questions are relevant. This type of interview is essentially exploratory, intended to 
prompt questions for future interviews (Merriam, 1998). Guided interviews are best when 
the researcher has knowledge of the topic but cannot anticipate the answers to the 
questions (Field, 1996). These interviews can be highly structured or standardized, meant 
to solicit specific answers to narrowly worded questions, or semi-structured, designed 
with more flexible, open-ended questions to elicit an individual’s unique perspectives 
(Marie, 2001).  
A semi-structured interview process was most appropriate for this study. 
Researchers were knowledgeable about the topic and this format provided enough 
structure to ensure all desired topics were explored, while providing the flexibility to 
react to interviewee responses and allow open dialogue to flow (Field, 1996). During 
interviews, the researchers utilized an interview guide (see Appendix D) to assist the 
process. As Marie (2001) points out, as this was a semi-structured interview process, this 
guide was not meant to be a structured schedule or protocol, but a list of general areas to 
be covered and a sample of potential questions to be asked. During the interview process, 
the researchers re-ordered, re-phrased, or perhaps added additional questions as they 
deemed appropriate to fit the situation and further explore the comments of the 
respondents. Additionally, at the end of the interview, respondents were often asked if 
they had anything else they would like to comment on, interesting stories they would like 
to tell, or other opinions that they felt should be recorded. 
Interviews were conducted in person face-to-face, via video telecommunications, 
and over the phone. When possible, interviews were conducted in person or with video in 
order to observe body language and other forms of informal communication (Cresswell, 
2012) that are often vital to full interpretation of the interaction. All interviews were 
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voice recorded, with the prior written and verbal consent of the participant, then 
transcribed. To protect the privacy and confidentiality of respondents, each was assigned 
a random number to identify the interview, and all transcripts were meticulously screened 
for any identifying information, which if found, was deleted from the transcripts.  
D. ROLES OF RESEARCHERS 
In qualitative studies, data is neither gathered nor analyzed by quantitative means 
such as computers, gauges, or counting devices. Rather, the researchers themselves are 
the primary instruments for data gathering and analysis (Merriam, 1998). In this study, 
the researchers gathered data through personal interviews, then analyzed and interpreted 
the data to make suppositions and conclusions. Two areas that deserve discussion here 
are the potential effects this has on, first, the data collected through the interview process 
and, second, the data interpretation and analysis.  
When it comes to data collection through interview, the researchers themselves 
introduce complexities into the process. This is a common criticism of this qualitative 
method. Alvesson (2003) describes an interview as a social situation that is context 
dependent, one in which social norms for how to express oneself and expectations of 
what the researcher wants to hear influence respondent behavior and thus the interview’s 
ability to reflect reality. He goes on to point out that “many would, however, believe that 
establishing close personal contact with respondents—who then are seen as ‘participants’ 
instead—may minimize this problem” (p. 169). This describes an extremely important 
role of the researchers in this study, that which Alvesson (2003) would describe as an 
observing participant. Such a relationship exists between the researchers in this study and 
the participants because they are all full members of the same social group, have shared 
like experiences and challenges, can identify with one another, and share a cultural 
understanding of language and symbology. As Frey (1994, as cited in Alvesson, 2003) 
describes: 
This makes the interview more honest, morally sound, and reliable, 
because it treats the respondent as an equal, allows him or her to express 
personal feelings, and therefore presents a more ‘realistic’ picture that can 
be uncovered using traditional interview methods. 
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The other major area of researcher influence, and criticism, is in the analysis and 
interpretation of the data collected. Merriam (1998) points out that the influence of 
researcher biases must be acknowledged in qualitative research. 
One of the philosophical assumptions underlying this type or research is 
that reality is not an objective entity; rather, there are multiple 
interpretations of reality. The researcher thus brings a construction of 
reality to the research situation, which interacts with other people’s 
constructions or interpretations of the phenomenon being studied. The 
final product of this type of study is yet another interpretation by the 
researcher of others’ views filtered through his or her own. 
This realization often causes concern that the analysis produced does not do justice to, or 
accurately mirror, the phenomenon under study as it actually existed (Alvesson, 2003). It 
is here again that it is useful to point out the role of the researchers in this study as active 
members of the societal group. Karra and Phillips (2007) point out that for an outsider it 
is often difficult to develop an adequate degree of cultural sensitivity. When the 
researchers come from within the group, however, “the problems of cultural competence, 
linguistic skill, and access would be reduced and the resulting research would have a 
greater degree of ‘authenticity’” (Marvasti, 2004, as cited in Karra & Phillips, 2007). 
Therefore, the autoethnographic approach provides a greater level of “ethnographic 
authority” (Wellman, 1994, as cited in Karra & Phillips, 2007).  
E. STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS  
Many of the strengths of this type of research study were previously discussed in 
this chapter within the discussions of ethnographic, autoethnographic and case study 
designs. A number of general limitations apply to all studies of this design as well. Such 
issues include the fact that qualitative research is often not generalizable to the larger 
population and so lacks external validity (Marie, 2001), and the issues of bias discussed 
in the previous section, which may lead to limited objectivity and influenced or invalid 
conclusions. The following section focuses on the limitations and strengths unique to this 
study. 
The major limitations of this study have to do with its scope, both in terms of the 
number of participants and the research and analysis methods used. As with any study 
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that requires volunteer participation, the participants have the option of declining to take 
part in the study. In this study, five of the initial 24 females, and five from subsequent 
generations, were successfully contacted but declined to participate. It is useful to 
recognize “no” responses because they qualify as positive contacts and provide additional 
data points, but it should also be recognized that this might introduce bias into the study. 
It could be postulated that many of the “no” responses may be due to some experience or 
perception that was shared across this group of the population. If this were true, failing to 
gather this data would skew the resultant conclusions and assumptions. Additionally, 
contact was attempted with initial and subsequent women, with no response, further 
limiting the sample population.  
As previously discussed, participant observation, which is a key process of 
traditional ethnographical research, was not feasible for this study. As Creswell (1998) 
points out, a true ethnography is a lengthy and involved process in which the researcher 
studies the meanings of behavior, language and interaction of a group through not only 
interviews, but observations of its members while immersed within the social setting as 
an active participant. In this study, participant observation was not feasible due to 
constraints in time and resources. As a result, the study was limited to personal interviews 
for purposes of data collection. Additionally, Creswell (1998) also asserts that the product 
of traditional ethnographical research studies typically comes in book-length form. 
Again, time and resources constrained the level of analysis that would be representative 
of a true ethnography, and a more surface-level review was conducted to identify 
common themes and make general assumptions that can later be tested more rigorously. 
In this regard, this project is more representative of a multiple case study. It is the 
researchers’ hope that the data collected as part of this study will aid and inspire such 
future research. 
The unique strengths of this study are a direct result of the composition of the 
research team: one, a 15-year career submariner and the other, one of the first 24 females 
integrated who has 15-years of experience in the Navy. Their biographies are included in 
Appendix E. This provided three distinct advantages. First, being members of the 
community being studied, the researchers were intimately familiar with the culture; the 
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language; the physical, psychological, and operational environment of the submarine; and 
the command and operational structure of the crew—all aspects of the social environment 
that an outside observer would have to spend countless hours observing and learning 
about to truly understand. Lack of this learning curve allowed this research project to 
commence immediately, at a time when many of the first female submariners were 
nearing the end of their commitments, transferring to other communities, or simply would 
not have remembered their experiences in any useful detail. Had this project not been 
autoethnographic in nature, these truly unique lived experiences would never have been 
captured.  
Second, being full members of the community allowed a deeper level of 
understanding and more thoughtful analysis of the data acquired, within the time 
constraints imposed by educational and service requirements. Dialog from interviews 
could be immediately understood without translation of acronyms or other submarine-
specific language. Stories of experiences could be understood in their context with no 
need for further explanation. An outside researcher would achieve much less 
understanding in a similar period of time. 
Third, the social position of the researchers in the community, one post-
department head and one post-division officer, put them in a unique position of trust 
among the study participants, as they were also at a similar level. Also, the researchers 
were not assigned by an Admiral or a Navy policy office; they were not command-level 
officers. They were mid-level officers who embarked upon this research project of their 
own volition and who had only one year prior been in the exact same position as the 
study participants; they were insiders. Combine this with the promise of complete 
anonymity and the best possible chance emerged to get the “real story,” to understand 
what was truly being experienced, thought, felt, perceived and believed by this group of 
submarine force pioneers. An additional advantage arose from this situation as well. One 
could easily imagine an ambitious individual preying on the naivety of an outside 
observer to paint an over-rosy picture of themselves or their situation for their own gain, 
or perhaps out of desire to not make waves in their organization; or conversely, to 
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maliciously portray their situation in the worst light possible. Both are situations that 
would be immediately apparent to an insider. 
A final strength of the study is that the knowledge and experience of the 
researchers put them in the perfect position to ensure complete confidentiality and 
anonymity of the participants so that they could feel comfortable telling the real stories of 
their experiences. This was paramount, as it maximized inclusion in the study and 
allowed for better communication flow during interviews. 
F. CONCLUSION 
With the data collected as described in this section, the researchers could then turn 
their attention toward analysis of the interview transcriptions in order to provide answers 
to the main research questions. As interview transcriptions were analyzed, themes were 
identified and conclusions drawn regarding the questions posed by the study. Supporting 
commentary was identified and annotated on paper copies of the transcriptions for use in 
the next chapter. Pertinent data was consolidated and notes taken on a case summary 
form, which is included as Appendix F for use in future research that may follow the 
model of this study. The rich data set provided excellent insight into the complex social 
process of female integration onboard submarines, as well as other topics that were 
somewhat outside the original scope of this study but which also warranted discussion. 
The results of this analysis are presented in the following section. 
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IV. CASE SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
The major goals of this study are twofold: 1) to create a rich data set, capturing 
the lived experiences of the first group of female submariners for follow-on studies; and 
2) to provide an analysis of the data that will address the main research questions. The 
primary research questions are: How would the first women to join the submarine force 
generally describe their integration experience? What factors supported or hindered their 
integration? What was the character of the organizational culture and how did it affect 
their experiences? Have their experiences affected them, professionally or personally, 
and, if so, how? What do the participants see as the benefits of their integration? In this 
chapter, these questions are addressed using interview commentary to support the 
researchers’ conclusions and to express the opinions of those involved.  
Analysis provided a description of the general experience of the participants. Due 
to constraints on the researchers’ time and resources, however, the analysis was limited to 
a cross-case evaluation, seeking to create generalizations from the details of each case 
(Merriam, 1998). Common themes were identified, and these discussed in detail in this 
chapter by research question. Additionally, several themes emerged that are beyond the 
original scope of this study but which warrant mention and are thus briefly discussed. 
These themes include views concerning the Supply Officer’s role as mentor, potential 
advantages of female integration that may not have been previously perceived, factors 
affecting female retention, and opinions regarding the future integration of enlisted 
females onboard submarines. Discussion of these themes is provided for potential future 
consideration. 
A. PREFACE 
Before delving into the analysis of this complex social phenomenon, a number of 
assertions must first be discussed. These are acknowledged by the researchers and should 
also be considered by the reader.  
First, the source of data for this study is personal accounts of events collected 
through interviews. While the effects of the researcher on this process are discussed in 
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Chapter III, it is now important to acknowledge the impact of the interviewee on the 
production of these data. As personal accounts, these data are necessarily subjective, 
molded by the participants’ beliefs, biases, psychological traits, and attitudes (Alvesson, 
2003), as well as a multitude of other factors. Additionally, responses may be affected by 
poor recall or simply poor articulation (Yin, 2009). In this study, these factors are taken 
as given and considered ultimately uncontrollable. 
Second, this study focuses primarily on external factors that influenced the 
integration process. It is important to acknowledge, however, that the “success” of an 
individual’s integration is not only a product of external influences but also of personal 
traits such as attitudes, drive, commitment, and social skills. The participants also 
recognized this fact, as conveyed by an interviewee in a personal communication: “I 
mean a lot of it just has to do with our personalities, I think. You know, how we 
integrated and built relationships and things like that.” In this study, no attempt is made 
to evaluate such personal attributes as to judge participant fitness, ability, or suitability in 
the context of their situation or experiences.  
Third, excerpts from the interviews conducted are used to support findings or to 
express views. It is necessary at times to take these comments with a proverbial “grain of 
salt,” as participants who perceived their experiences to be “poor” tended to use strong 
language accentuating negative connotations, and vice versa for those experiences 
characterized as “excellent.” Each experience, perception, or opinion described here 
should be viewed as a data point from which something may be learned. 
Finally, it must be acknowledged that critical scrutiny in pursuit of honest self-
assessment is rarely an easy process. The nature of this study itself, as an organizational 
ethnography, creates unique challenges. Alvesson (2003) points out how organizational 
studies such as this may create political dilemmas, especially for management, as they 
often result in data or analysis that works contrary to efforts to maintain organizational 
prestige. As Alvesson (2003) writes: 
Good organizational ethnographies often portray their objects of study in 
non-flattering terms. Actually, hardly any social setting comes out of an 
ethnographic study unblemished. Most well-done studies working beyond 
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front-stage and the level of image-production produce some far from 
positive descriptions and analysis. This may be one reason for us being 
more inclined to study the others rather than ourselves. (p. 180) 
While this statement proved true to some extent, this study also reveals many 
positive and encouraging results. The researchers made every effort to ensure unbiased 
analysis of the data and intended in no way for this study to reflect poorly on the 
submarine community or its leadership. The data and analysis presented provides an 
authentic recount of a process that occurred within the organization, as perceived by its 
own members. It is meant to provide a launching point for further research from which 
the organization can learn and grow and to capture data that may have otherwise been 
lost. 
B. THE POPULATION 
To provide perspective, the following is a breakdown of the population of 
participants and a general description of their demographics and background. To begin 
this study, 25 female submarine officers were successfully contacted. Of the 25 
contacted, 16 were from the first group of 24 females selected for integration. Following 
initial contact, nine declined to participate in the study, and no additional reply was 
received from one. This left a total of 15 participants, 11 of whom were from the first 
group. The final group of 15 participants included nine nuclear-trained officers and six 
Supply Officers.  
Two-thirds of the participants (ten) came from families in which at least one 
member of the immediate family, parents or siblings, had some military experience. Of 
this group, six had family members with Navy backgrounds. The participants came from 
a variety of educational settings. Four attended the Naval Academy, seven attended 
ROTC programs in college, and four used a commissioning recruitment program. Nine 
received technical degrees and six were non-technical majors. Two of the women were 
prior enlisted.  
When asked of their initial intention to make the Navy a career or simply finish a 
single term, seven were undecided, four intended to complete one term, and four planned 
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on completing a career in the Navy. Motivations to join the Navy were varied and 
included factors such as the desire to complete a college degree, family background, 
feelings of patriotism, wanting the Navy experience, and starting a career. Dominant 
among these motivations was college, family, and patriotism. When asked about 
motivations to join the submarine force, responses also varied, but again, common 
themes emerged. Motivations included experience on submarine cruises, either as a 
Midshipman or a rider; perceptions of the nature of submarine personnel as being elite 
and of the highest caliber; and the small, tight-knit family nature of submarine crews. 
Also mentioned was outside encouragement from family members or from members of 
organizations where participants had previously worked. Such encouragement often came 
from prior submariners at ROTC units or other work environments. There was also much 
interest in the nature of the submarine mission, as it was perceived to be more interesting 
or “cool.” A dominant motivation throughout most of the interviews was the perception 
of the people and crews, as captured here: 
So I think the one thing that really made me decide submarines for 
sure…just the prospect of being able to work with such a high caliber of 
people and to do some incredibly awesome things…I just wanted to be a 
part of it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think I like the way the submarine community and the camaraderie is 
more than I do the surface. So when they said hey, you can go on 
submarines I was like, alright, let’s do it. Let’s try this. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
I really wanted to lead people. That was one of the biggest reasons I joined 
the Navy and I realized in aviation that wasn’t going to happen until like 
ten years in, and in submarines I could do that day one and with probably 
the most elite people in the Navy. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
As discussed in Chapter III, women were assigned to SSBNs and SSGNs on both 
the East and West coasts, in Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington. Of the 15 
participants, six were assigned to SSBNs, eight were assigned to SSGNs, and one served 
aboard both types of ships. Nine were stationed on the East Coast and six on the West 
Coast. Additionally, seven participants were single and eight were married. Interestingly, 
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all eight married women had spouses who were also in the Navy, most of them also 
submariners.  
C. THE GENERAL EXPERIENCE 
To answer the main research question of how the participants would describe their 
integration experience, each interview was analyzed and divided into four categories, 
based subjectively on the researchers’ analysis of the quality of their integration 
experience. Experiences were rated as overall excellent, good, neutral, or poor. This 
assessment was based on evidence provided within the commentary, compared across all 
interviews. Also factored in was discussion of whether participants would again make the 
decision to join the submarine force based on what they now know, their intentions to 
remain in the Navy, and whether they would return to submarines for a second tour (in 
the case of the nuclear officers) or if they would ever consider going back to a submarine 
(in the case of the Supply Officers). These last discussion points were only considered to 
the extent that they actually served to inform the analysis of the quality of the integration 
experience. For example, in instances where an individual’s description of her experience 
could be described as good or excellent, but she indicated she would not return to the 
submarine force again, the quality rating would remain unaffected if it were clear that the 
decision not to return was unrelated to the integration experience itself. There were 
certainly extremes among the participants. At the high end, one participant described her 
experience as follows: 
My experience was so special on that boat. Like I would definitely do it 
again. I would definitely do it again. I felt like I was really lucky to have 
the crew that I served with. Like overall, I was very happy. I just definitely 
think that experience alone was very unique and I am so glad that I got 
picked up for it and I am so glad that I volunteered and did what we did. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
At the other end of the spectrum, however, one participant’s experience led to an 
attempted suicide. These extremes bookend the study, and are perhaps worthy of closer 
examination; this is, however, best left for future research, as it is beyond the scope of the 
present project. Between these extremes, the experiences of the population of participants 
were rated as excellent in two cases, good in six cases, neutral in three cases, and poor in 
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five cases. It is worth noting that the total number of evaluations sums to 16, which is due 
to one participant having served on two different submarines. These results are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Count of Participant Overall Experience by Quality Rating  







Analysis begins to describe the integration experience in very general terms. To 
further explain these results, contributing factors are identified. Discussion of these 
themes also serves to answer the next two research questions and to describe experiences 
in more detail. 
D. SUPPORTING AND HINDERING FACTORS 
The question of what factors supported or hindered integration efforts helps to 
explain participants’ overall views regarding the experience. While a myriad of 
individual contributing factors could be used to explain these results, several common 
factors emerge that are useful in drawing more general conclusions. In general, a factor 
was considered supporting when differential treatment was minimized, command 
leadership promoted climates of professionalism and mutual respect, and the initial 
socialization period was minimized in terms of both duration and severity. Conversely, 
when the opposite occurred, a factor was seen to hinder the process. Another supporting 
factor was the mentorship role played by the senior female Supply Officer, both for the 
nuclear-trained female junior officers as well as for the command team. Finally, a 
hindering factor unique to the female Supply Officers was the perceived respect shown to 
their position as a department head. Each of these themes is discussed in more detail in 
the following section. 
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1. Differential Treatment 
Perhaps the first major theme, which became clear very early on in the interview 
process, was how attuned the participants were to perceptions of treatment that they were 
considered to be different. This perception seemed to often translate into feelings of 
inequality. In all but two interviews, participants made a deliberate point of discussing 
instances in which they felt they were being treated differently than their male 
counterparts. Many instances were very blatant examples of differential treatment, but 
some may be considered relatively minor. In describing her experiences at submarine 
officer basic training, an interviewee offered the following observation during a training 
event:  
…they told us we should wear our t-shirts and shorts to go into the tower. 
I was like, that was just ridiculous, but okay sure.…it was just me and one 
other girl that had to experience it because, afterwards, we were like it’s 
not really a thing, you don’t really need to make them wear t-shirts and 
shorts. It’s—we have standard Navy bathing suits just like everybody else. 
When speaking about a senior female officer who had been recently sent to be 
staff at a training command, two different participants recounted the organization’s 
efforts to provide a female mentor.  
…the word on the street was that she had been sent there because she was 
a female nuke, to be able to like mentor…the general feeling there was, 
like, don’t talk to us, we don’t want to be special. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
…that was just kind of the only time where I felt, like, why are we sitting 
here, why is it just us? (Interviewee, personal communication) 
It is these seemingly benign occurrences that are the most telling. The fact that 
participants would make it a point to discuss such experiences illuminates the sensitivity 
of the subject.  
The phase of integration that generated the fewest comments regarding 
differential treatment was Nuclear Power School. This is not surprising due to the fact 
that female nuclear Surface Warfare Officers routinely attend the curriculum and the 
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school operates on a very set, regimented schedule. Participant experiences at Prototype 
training were somewhat dissimilar.  
The training schedule at Prototype is not purely academic as is the case at Nuclear 
Power School. Successful completion of Prototype requires many hours of training on an 
operational nuclear power plant. Training hours must be split among all the students and 
the amount of training time available is often affected by equipment malfunction or other 
uncontrollable circumstances, which also often introduces delays in student graduation. 
For the first groups of women, such delays had the potential to affect their training 
timelines and, ultimately, the dates they would be able to report to their respective 
submarines. Attempts to mitigate these delays also resulted in numerous perceptions of 
inequality and multiple comments by study participants. Here are two examples: 
[An instructor] came up to me and there was one other female in the 
section and he pulled us aside and he was like, “look, you two need to stay 
ahead of the curve. I already have to send a report about you every single 
week”…What happened to us not being treated any differently? Are you 
giving weekly reports on everybody else?…I didn’t understand why, you 
know, we were being watched like hawks. Well, I understood it, but at the 
same time I was like this kind of makes me feel like you are not treating 
me like the guys. I would prefer to be treated like the guys. This is already 
weird enough being a female on a submarine. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
Definitely made it clear that since I was like the first class and they had a 
deadline to get us to our boats…So that kind of stood out to me a little bit. 
(Interviewee, personal communication)  
Prior to reporting to submarines, all participants, both nuclear and Supply 
Officers, were required to attend the Submarine Officer Basic Course (SOBC). Unlike the 
nuclear training pipeline, women had not routinely attended this course. Not surprisingly, 
this phase of training also generated a variety of comments regarding differential 
treatment, such as this: 
Sub school was pretty interesting. We—so we noticed—they put the four 
of us girls in the same section, so everybody else was alphabetical and the 
rest of us were put in the same section.…Then the thing that bugged me 
was on the grade sheets our names were in red and everybody else’s were 
in black.…that was another one of those things where it’s like, we are not 
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being treated like the rest of the guys. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
One training exercise, required during submarine officer basic training, involves 
conducting a simulated underwater escape. An incident at this training simulator 
generated comments from five separate participants. One participant’s account is as 
follows: 
…We were all ill in some way, shape, or form. We got cleared by the doc 
to not do it.…So none of us got to do it and then after everything was all 
said and done, like 20 minutes later, the [instructor] wanted to meet with 
us and he pulled us into a separate room. Didn’t pull any of the guys in 
there that didn’t do it.…he berated us and accused us of lying and all that 
fun stuff. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Comments about differential treatment were not only generated during the 
training phase of integration. Multiple instances during a participant’s time on board the 
submarines were also discussed, as recounted in these two comments: 
It did get frustrating around the time when we were supposed to 
qualify…we were just in limbo for two or three months not really knowing 
what we needed to do.…she and I were qualified officer of the deck, the 
two other guys weren’t. So [the guys] qualified fish and officer of the deck 
at the same time. We had a three-month gap. So I don’t know, maybe it 
was just that we weren’t ready in his eyes. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
So I remember after we kind of got settled, the [evaluation] team was just 
like silent and it was weird because usually they are up in everybody’s 
face and they said to my XO, they are like, “We have never seen a female 
officer of the deck before.” It’s like, what? They were shocked. Like 
absolutely blown away that not only like I was a female, I was qualified 
officer of the deck. They were like, “She was giving orders to those guys 
and they were listening.” It was just like it absolutely floored me that they 
were so surprised that this girl had just dove the ship and the command 
trusted the girl to do that. I was actually pissed, but it was also I was really 
riled up. Like, fuck you guys. Like why couldn’t I do that? (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
Not all commentary concerning differential treatment carried a negative 
connotation. Further, some were very telling of how rooted the desires were to be 
considered an equal among male counterparts. Two participants offered the following 
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opinions regarding experiences that would likely be viewed as very positive by many 
people: 
…getting my dolphins. That was—it was a very bittersweet day. I did it 
pretty quickly in comparison to most of the JOs on my boat. I probably 
worked myself a little bit harder than I should have to get them in the time 
that I did. Then having like such a huge press release with it where CNN 
and Fox News and everybody was there. I just wanted to be normal and I 
just wanted to be one of the guys. It was really hard to do that when the 
external community kept making it a big deal. So I think that was a big 
milestone, just realizing—it was a big realization for me that no matter 
what I did I wasn’t going to be normal. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
…when we all went to see the President. That’s kind of hard to explain to 
your guys, like oh well, I am just a normal JO. That’s what we have been 
preaching for the last you know, x amount, and that’s how you are 
expecting me, but now I am going to visit the President. So that was really 
frustrating. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
While it was apparent from the commentary that participants were sensitive to 
instances of perceived inequality, it was also clear that they were equally attuned to 
behaviors that sought to limit differentiation, as seen here:  
So there was this big push to get our group of girls to SOBC on time.…So 
they started coming up with these plans. “Hey, you guys are going to work 
double shifts and the girls take priority and they get the watches and you 
know, you don’t get days off, you just have to keep coming in” and all this 
bullshit. We actually had a pretty legitimate staff XO who caught wind of 
that…basically said “stop it, this isn’t how we do business.” You train 
them the same as the men. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Our XO had been a big part of women in integration.…I mean he just said 
it outright as soon as we got there…”Hey, they are not to be treated any 
differently. They are here, it’s not a big deal, they are just junior officers.” 
I think instead of trying to hide it and tiptoe around it, just saying it 
outright everyone was like okay, we are moving on. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
The following excerpts are meant to serve as examples of the acute awareness of 
treatment that seemed in some way differential. The implication is not that differential 
treatment necessarily results in a poor integration experience; in fact, many of the 
preceding comments were from participants whose experience was characterized by them 
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as anything other than poor. The point is simply that there is an effect. When cross-
analyzing these descriptions of experiences, it is clear that the general opinion of the 
population was that they desired to be treated as equals. Behaviors, insomuch as they 
tended to promote inequality, were generally harmful to the process, while those who 
sought to reduce it were generally beneficial. One participant offered the following 
conclusion: 
…the biggest thing is that remaining normal. I think that’s the most 
important thing for a JO to be successful is to be given the same standards 
and held to the same standards and not treated differently. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
2. Command Climate and Leadership 
Command climate and senior leadership appear to have the greatest overall 
impact on the success of the integration process. This topic was raised in one form or 
another in over 80 percent of the interviews conducted. The commentary on this subject, 
as represented below, highlights how vital a command climate conducive to integration 
can be in the process. 
Yes, so my command was really great…I think that’s the key for the 
leadership, you know.…it has to be managed on an individual leadership 
level. The COs, the COBs, the XOs, and the department heads setting the 
right tone. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Where there were some hiccups along the way on submarines, I think that 
can be entirely attributed to the command climate, which is not just 
because of the CO, XO, and COB. I mean everybody contributes to that… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Within the topic of command climate and leadership, three similar but distinct 
sub-themes emerged that explain aspects viewed as necessary in creating a successful 
climate. It is worth noting that these sub-themes are heavily intertwined with the 
participant’s desires to achieve equality. The first of these is the necessity of setting a 
tone of professionalism and respect that would promote uniformity and teamwork at all 
levels. Command leadership that did this well established a culture on board, based on 
professionalism and respect, that promoted genuine buy-in from every member of the 
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crew and set the right foundation for not just the women, but for everyone to be 
successful. The following comments address this theme: 
I would like to say it was our professionalism.…So I think probably the 
buy-in from my chain of command made a big difference.…we had a very 
professional culture. They communicated that down to the crew that this is 
acceptable behavior and this is not. So yes, I think absolutely that is a huge 
contributing factor to a non-issue integration. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I think it’s the baseline that the chain of command established.…the CO 
and XO on my second boat really set the standards for a professional 
atmosphere and a comfortable atmosphere. I think that made all the 
difference in everything. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…our command had that good culture because [the CO’s] opinion was 
that inappropriate behavior is inappropriate and if you wouldn’t do it in 
front of your mother, don’t do it on my ship because I’m not going to put 
up with that. So that was the culture before we even got there…that’s a 
culture decision by the leadership. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…dignity and respect. That was the policy onboard, everyone shall be 
treated with dignity and respect and as any other sailor coming onboard to 
get quals. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
The wardroom is the wardroom and we are brothers and sisters in naval 
service and we support each other and we defend each other and that’s 
what I expect from you when you interact with the crew. Nobody is 
talking crap or anything about any of the officers of the wardroom. If you 
hear that, it’s your responsibility to stop it as a fellow officer.…That’s 
what we did. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
It was equally as obvious to participants when the command team was disengaged 
or disinterested in promoting a command climate that valued formality and 
professionalism, and when mutual respect was not enforced. 
My captain—I mean he’s a good CO, but he definitely let things happen in 
the wardroom that I don’t think should have been happening.…the 
environment that he’s allowing to happen, I did not agree with it at all. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I don’t know how the process had gone on the crew before I got there, but 
again, I think it was a professionalism difference. I felt like the second 
crew was much more professional and I think that really set a standard for 
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the differences between where the two crews were at. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
…near the end, like I was saying, the culture, and this was the culture 
driven by the CO, the command team.…at the end of the day it did cause 
bad behavior by lots of people. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
The second sub-theme seen to support an environment conducive to integration is 
a leadership stance that serves to downplay the process, or at least discourages excessive 
attention. In this vein, successful leadership efforts tended to promote normality and ease 
the transition for the entire crew, as seen here: 
Their attitude was kind of like this is going to be a non-issue. There is no 
issue here. We are going to treat everyone the same. So there was kind of 
genuine buy-in that these women deserve to be here, so everyone is going 
to deal with it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…the command just did a good job of letting them know that hey, you 
know they are just like any other DIVOs that come to your boat. I am also 
sure that the wardroom really helped out with that because they too made 
us feel like we are just the new DIVOs that came on that don’t know 
anything. But that’s a really good way—I mean everyone gets treated like 
that, so I am okay with it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
My CO’s big mantra was, “be normal.” They are not female JOs, they are 
JOs. They are normal, we are treating them normal. Their quals are 
normal, their behavior is normal, our behavior toward them is normal. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
With my first CO, he was pretty—he was straightforward. He was—a 
couple of times, “this is different, let me know if things aren’t okay.” But 
he also didn’t make it a huge production … (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
The last theme discussed across multiple interviews is the extent to which 
leadership was actively involved in the integration process, and how leaders would 
anticipate issues. In some cases, leadership was perceived to purposefully remain 
detached and disinvested. This was seen as damaging to integration efforts.  
I would have liked to have more of a relationship with my second CO, but 
I think he really shied away from dealing with the female junior officers, 
which was—we thought we were a little bit crazy at first. Like hey, this 
isn’t—is this happening, is he really just avoiding us? Ultimately I am not 
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sure if he was intimidated by our personalities or if he really was 
intimidated by the fact that we were women, but he spent a lot more time 
and invested a lot more time and energy in mentoring the male JOs than he 
did mentoring us. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
It’s like they just talked vaguely mostly along the lines of, you know, 
don’t screw a midshipman.…[The CO] just seemed like this distant guy, 
like he always seemed super distant to me. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
On the other hand, participants often took notice when command leadership took 
an active interest in the process and confronted issues directly. Active leadership also 
promoted an environment in which the participants themselves felt empowered to speak 
up and address issues. This was seen as having a positive impact.  
…the command element really made the nonsense, the things that could 
have got in the way, that wasn’t just really there. But, I also think that the 
girls that we had on our sub, the women, were not afraid to say something 
I think that was really key. If you are in a work environment where you 
feel like you can’t speak up if you have been offended, that’s not really a 
good environment to be in. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think in the beginning stages, upon taking the boat, there were little 
speculations that they were giving favorable treatment to females in terms 
of qualifications. But, I think that was squashed pretty quickly… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I had this meeting with [the XO] on a weekly basis.…the XO would spend 
a lot of time seeing and evaluating where they were in the process, it was a 
good sign to me. I think it was just a great chain of command and they 
knew it could be something that’s…a very big deal to the ship. They just 
really wanted to make sure it was done the right way. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
If guys make inappropriate comments, it’s corrected on the spot. I think 
that [boat name] did it the right way by just truly in how leadership 
approached the integration, and that was that there wasn’t one. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Commentary offered by many participants regarding perceived differences 
following a change of command serves to highlight the effects of command leadership 
and climate.  
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…so the once really tight wardroom turned into a little bit bigger split 
between the JOs and the department heads and up. Yes, so everything I 
had seen when I first showed up was kind of unraveling for a while. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
…my first CO was really great. My second CO also really great, but less 
strict about behavior and things definitely started to deteriorate. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
The command that I reported to, the boat definitely met the expectations 
of the camaraderie that I was expecting. Unfortunately, the CO that I 
reported onboard with left at the end of my first run, so I only had him for 
about three months. The XO that I had left three months after that. So it 
was a complete chain of command turnaround six months after I showed 
up. Unfortunately, it was for the absolute worst … (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
It is readily apparent from the experiences of the participants how important good 
command climate was to the success of the integration process, and, at the same time, 
how destructive poor leadership could be. This command climate must be driven from the 
top and fostered at every level of leadership. Of all the factors that contributed to the 
quality of the integration experience, leadership and climate likely have the largest effect, 
and this effect is lasting. Experiences by at least two participants indicate that good 
leadership and climate are even more important and beneficial during initial integration. 
Conversely, poor leadership and climate are likely the most destructive influences on 
integration efforts. During this sensitive stage, setting the right cultural foundation is 
vitally important. Additionally, once it is set, even the ill effects of poor follow-on 
leadership are greatly reduced. Two participants, who both felt that their initial command 
leadership and climate were excellent, described their experiences after a change in 
command leadership as follows: 
Yes, there was definitely a climate change and I think that would probably 
happen with any new CO and new XO and new COB. I just think that the 
way that the [new] captain specifically was trying to communicate his 
goals wasn’t a very—I will use his word—it was a very draconian way. I 
think people just naturally don’t like that…as far as the women in 
submarines part, I think that, you know, our sub just kind of kept it at a 
high level, and I think that part of it, once you know, the initial command 
element left, was just people standing up and saying something if they 
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thought that hey, this isn’t appropriate. That was both guys and girls. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I don’t think that the crew’s perspective changed drastically with the 
change in the leadership.…we were in the shipyard at that point and the 
CO and XO, like I said, were not supportive. That led to an overall decline 
in the command climate, overall. But, we were—I would say overall we 
were still all in the same mindset together. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
3. Socialization Period 
Another prevalent theme in this study was the initial socialization or “warming 
up” period that occurred between the crews and the participants upon reporting to their 
commands. This period was discussed in over 90 percent of the interviews conducted and 
was characterized by feelings of standoffishness, nervousness, avoidance, fear, and 
difficulties in communication. Understandably, crews were apprehensive and perhaps 
even a bit fearful about the prospect of introducing women into their community, which 
they had known to be male for as long as they had been members of it. The participants 
often expressed this period in negative terms, as it generally enhanced feelings of 
inequality and differential treatment. While a warm-up period would logically seem to be 
expected, discussions of it often elicited rather strong feelings among the participants, as 
observed in these comments:  
So guys were actually pretty shy when I got there. Like for me, working 
with male sailors wasn’t really a big deal. I have done it before on a 
surface ship, but guys were actually pretty shy.…So, that just bothered the 
crap out of me, so I basically said, “Okay, this has to go and we have to 
break the ice.” So I tried really hard to break the ice and actually get to 
know the sailors, all the male sailors basically. I think that helped me a lot. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
They actually made us feel a little unwelcome by being so stuffy and 
formal and far away, or at least in my case it felt like that. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
When we came to the submarines the crews were, one, scared shitless that 
women were coming and two, like very highly trained as to what was 
proper and what was appropriate and what was not. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
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…there was no animosity. It wasn’t combative at all. It was really 
awkward because they just didn’t know how to talk to me. I was new, I 
understand that, but being a female on top of it, being a female, they just 
didn’t know how to approach me. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I get to my boat and I start qualifying and I am super excited to be there 
and I loved talking to people about everything from the forward end of the 
boat to the aft end of the boat and it only started dampening down a little 
bit as I realized that they weren’t excited to talk to me. They actually 
didn’t even want to associate with me in anything but the most stiff and 
professional manner … (Interviewee, personal communication) 
The initial training regimen that crews were required to complete prior to 
integration was often cited as a major contributor to the severity of the warm-up period 
length. Most participants agreed that this initial training was at least somewhat valuable 
to the process, but many also indicated that it seemed rather excessive. It was widely 
agreed that the extensive training seemed to have bred a level of animosity toward the 
new female officers, and that it ultimately detracted from integration efforts by 
exacerbating and lengthening the warm-up period. 
…they are so scared of women. That’s like really my initial assessment of 
them, is they were scared shitless, probably you know because of the 
training by the command. The command scared them into being really 
nice. This is not how people behave…just relax and be normal, please. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
The crew had gotten a lot of training before we showed up as far as sexual 
harassment training, integration training. They had, I don’t know how 
many hours or how many topics, but they had to be certified for 
integration, based on the training that was conducted. So some of the guys 
had told us later on, that they were afraid that anything they said to us 
could be taken the wrong way and it would be our word against theirs and 
they would get masted for sexual harassment.…I used to joke with the XO 
the first week or so, like when we were doing casualty drills it was like, 
“XO, just follow me. I will clear a path for you.” (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I know before we got there, there was a whole bunch of female orientation 
training and so they were probably still pretty nervous from that. You 
could see they were a little bit worried about offending us more than if 
they hadn’t gotten all of that. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
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The crew thought that it was an overkill. I think they were just bombarded 
with all of these trainings because the crew had to be certified prior to 
receiving females. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Many participants indicated that one of the main reasons this training aggravated 
the warm-up period was due to its heavy focus on issues related to sexual harassment. 
This focus resulted in such ardent efforts to avoid contact with women that it interfered 
with not only the ability to converse with male crew members to gain knowledge for 
qualifications, but even with normal daily routines such as conducting wake-ups for the 
oncoming watch section. Some comments also indicated topics that would have been 
beneficial—such as procedures for entering female staterooms, general professionalism, 
and proper use and care of sanitary facilities—were often altogether neglected in initial 
training. 
Everyone stops paying attention after the first slide because they have had 
it for the last 16 times. So negative connotation is already put with being a 
female on a submarine because you made me sit through training that you 
didn’t have to go through.…There is a requirement for—I think there is an 
instruction—there is part of the instruction tells you how to enter a 
female’s room. Tell you in two years—two years—the crew changed a 
little, but not a lot. I could never get someone to enter my room correctly. I 
even posted a sign. I put it on pink paper. I highlighted it yellow. I put it 
outside my door. I put it outside the CO’s stateroom and I put it outside 
the wardroom—and the crew’s mess. Because I wanted it to be perfectly 
clear how to enter my stateroom. So instead, I just didn’t get people to 
enter my stateroom at all.…They weren’t meaning to be rude or 
disrespectful or anything like that, it’s just that fear that trouble will come 
because I went through this training that says if I do anything wrong to a 
female it’s going to be hell and high water. Stay away from them because 
you will be fine. You can’t get in trouble if you don’t interact with them. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Well, from everyone that I spoke to, ad-nauseam they had more SAPR 
training than anything. I am of the opinion that is not directly related in 
any way to integration, especially on submarines. If you have three or four 
women in a crew of 100, up to 150, 200 people…your focus should just be 
on a generality of hey, let’s make this environment professional. It was 
clear to me, sitting through SAPR training with everyone else, that we 
were blamed for a lot of this SAPR training that they had to deal with 
because it was overkill. It was poor timing because that was the time when 
the Navy started doing a lot more SAPR stuff, but it was still overkill.…I 
think it’s unrealistic to think there is not going to be swearing onboard. I 
 65 
think it’s unrealistic to not think that there’s not going to be R rated 
movies that have nudity. What I do think is realistic is to expect people not 
to be running around naked, talking in really disgusting phrases and terms 
that they may have been used to doing, having missile tubes that have half 
naked women when you are about to pull into port. But, I don’t think that 
has anything to do with integration, I think that has more to do with being 
professional and having a professional work environment. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
…someone saying offensive things shouldn’t happen anyway, but 
someone explaining how a valve works and having to use words like the 
lead screw and the head…shouldn’t be unprofessional, because that’s what 
it is called. But the guys are like, oh, I don’t want to say the wrong thing 
and have them take it as I am trying to be too sexual with them. We were 
in port for only about a week before we got underway and the attitude of 
kind of standoffish was there throughout the in port period. After we got 
underway, after we actually started working and standing watch and 
spending more time with a watch team, they quickly realized that one, we 
weren’t the type of people that would take something completely out of 
proportion and two, we weren’t the type of people that would address it in 
that manner. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I will never forget this one Fireman, A-gang fireman. Big guy. Big, strong, 
buff guy. Totally mortified to come and wake us up. Completely just—I 
mean shaking in his boots. I finally noticed that he was kind of lurking 
outside of the door and said, “What’s going on?” “I just don’t want to be 
disrespectful. I don’t want to offend anybody.” (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
It was clear that the initial warm-up period was an obstacle for nearly all of the 
participants. Once past this hurdle, however, experiences generally improved, as these 
comments indicate: 
…so they stopped walking on eggshells, they started being normal around 
us and just getting the job done, which was a major relief. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
…guys were pretty shy. But…some—a few guys came to me and actually 
talked to me and introduced themselves on their own, which was really 
welcoming.…breaking the ice with the rest of the crew, that was a big 
challenge, but I think that we actually did it really well as far as getting to 
know each other. After we broke the ice, things were just fine. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
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The initial warm-up period cannot, in itself, be viewed as a hindrance to 
integration, as it would be naive to not expect its occurrence, and all participants 
experienced it across the board. Therefore, the warm-up period was taken as a given by 
the researchers, and its impacts on quality of the integration experience were judged only 
as a function of its length and severity. Behaviors leading to command environments that 
tended to lengthen the process or intensify its negative impacts were viewed as 
detrimental. Command efforts to shorten this period, or lessen its effects, were perceived 
to enhance the integration experience. Not surprisingly, this was best achieved through 
strong command leadership that supported a culture of equality, as evidenced in the 
following comments: 
The COB is the one who actually is the one who put the fear of death into 
the crew. He was very effective at it. It still exists today that they won’t do 
things like give you wakeups because messengers will not walk into a 
female stateroom.…they just expressed that they had been threatened with 
losing their jobs if they had done something to make us feel that the 
program wasn’t working. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I felt like we were immediately accepted, which I am sure was really hard 
to do at first because we were totally different, just totally different having 
us there, but I felt like everyone was kind of nervous at first and then 
obviously once they saw that we weren’t aliens, we were just normal 
people, they kind of warmed up to us.…I am sure the command just did a 
good job of letting them know that hey, you know they are just like any 
other DIVOs that come to your boat. I am also sure that the wardroom 
really helped out with that because they too made us feel like we are just 
the new DIVOs that came on that don’t know anything. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
4. Supply Officers as Dual-Purpose Mentors 
A topic discussed in over 85 percent of the interviews was the role of the Supply 
Officer as a mentor. Current policy requires that a Supply Officer with previous warfare 
qualification be assigned to any crew that is integrated. These experienced female 
officers are intended to fill the department head position onboard and serve as a mentor to 
the inexperienced, female nuclear-trained officers. A good deal of discussion occurred on 
this topic, and many opinions regarding this role were gathered from the participants, 
leading to some interesting and informative conclusions. First, it was unanimously agreed 
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among all participants who discussed this topic that, for the initial integration, great value 
could be achieved in having a senior female mentor as part of the process.   
So initially, I think that obviously it was a good model to use…I think it 
would have been really tough if I went to the submarine by myself.…I 
think specifically if we had any female issues, you know if I felt like I was 
being discriminated against or people were being offensive, it would 
naturally be easier for me to talk to a Lieutenant female department head 
vice a male, but obviously as I was on the submarine longer and I was 
more comfortable with everyone, I could talk to anybody about that.…I 
just felt like she was a sounding board for us and then also for questions 
that we didn’t want to ask, we could ask her and then she would go ask for 
us. So yes, so it was good.…the female department head model is a good 
one, whether or not it necessarily needs to be the Supply Officer… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I don’t know if it necessarily needs to be a Supply Officer, but I do think 
having the Supply Officer on there initially was really helpful, just for the 
crew to see someone who has had experience in the fleet before and to 
understand those interactions because for a JO, they haven’t developed 
their leadership style yet. They don’t necessarily know what kind of 
impact something they say is going to have. A lot of the guys felt 
comfortable talking to me and not to them because of my experience in the 
rest of the Navy. So I think it’s valuable to have a senior woman on 
there… (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…I really appreciated the fact that they put a lot of thought into it and I 
really appreciated the fact that they sent a kind of more senior Lieutenant 
out to sea with us when we were Ensigns.…we didn’t know if this was 
just a JO issue or if this was a female issue. So just, kind of having a 
sounding board, and someone we could talk to…I don’t think there was 
ever anything that we couldn’t have handled on our own, but it was nice to 
have someone there that we knew would advocate for us and have a little 
bit more weight and experience with the Navy.…my personal thoughts on 
it is that for initial integration I think there is value in having Supply 
Officers there. I think there is tremendous value in having these 
experienced women who can advocate on gender issues. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
Another perceived advantage of having a senior female department head as part of 
initial integration was the role that they played, not as mentors to the other female junior 
officers, but as mentors to the command team. Participants expressed the opinion that the 
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Supply Officer’s role as a liaison and counselor for command leadership was equally as 
valuable. 
I didn’t necessarily expect to be like mother goose or anything for the two 
girls, but I do know they confided in me and they asked for advice, and 
that was great, but I felt like the person that I impacted, or the people I 
impacted the most were the senior enlisted, the crew, and the first CO that 
I had. He respected my opinions and he would bounce things off of me to 
see if it made sense. The XO, when he tried to ask me to approach one of 
the girls for something that he should have approached her about himself, 
I told him no, I wouldn’t do that. I am not just the person that talks to the 
girls. That’s not really how that relationship works. As an XO, you need to 
learn how to talk to the women as well. They are your junior officers. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
…she was also kind of a figure head so that she could talk to the XO and 
the CO about how we were doing in general and you know, I think that’s 
definitely true. I think that she kind of was a liaison to them just as much 
as to us. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think that you know, as scary as it was for us, I think it was much more 
scary for our department heads, our XO and our CO, because they really 
didn’t know how to talk to us in a lot of instances. So yes, I think having a 
more senior female that they felt they could relate to or is more 
experienced that they could use as a sounding board as to how to mentor 
us or talk to us about certain issues.…Honestly, I think that my second CO 
didn’t know how to talk to any of us. It was just kind of a little bit 
comical, but also a little bit disappointing. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I definitely had to mentor the CO and XO. I remember the XO came to me 
one day and said, “Hey, I need you to talk to the females…I don’t know 
how to bring this up to you and I just thought maybe you could help me 
talk to them. Or, it’s probably just easier for you to talk to them for me.” 
We had a closed-door conversation after that… (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
…my second CO actually came and asked me about my opinions or you 
know, my recommendations on certain issues that involved female JOs. 
The CO actually would rely on me on things like that. Yes, so just being 
an advisor to the CO and mentor for, not only the female JOs, but also like 
just the crew in general. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
While it was agreed that having a senior female mentor was important for the 
initial integration, many participants indicated that having that role filled by a Supply 
 69 
Officer also created unique challenges. Some opinions were that the vastly different roles 
of the two groups created an inevitable disconnect. For example, it was difficult for 
Supply Officers to identify with nuclear officers because they had not gone through the 
same experiences. It was also expressed that additional difficulties arose because the 
Supply Officers assigned to be mentors for the submarine officers were not themselves 
submariners yet.  
I think it was good initially. I think it’s a hard sell to have a mentor that’s 
not your same designator. I think initially we were told that as soon as a 
female officer got senior enough, a nuke female gets senior enough, there 
wouldn’t be that requirement, but it’s still sitting and, from what I hear 
now, they will continue to have female Supply Officer department heads 
until a nuke comes back as a department head. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
…I think that initially it’s a great model to use, although the idea that you 
have these two brand new nuke Ensigns and a seasoned Lieutenant as their 
mentor…didn’t really work like that, because all three of us were trying to 
figure out what the heck a submarine does and how it works. So as far as 
someone who we could go to, I get it that it’s built in, but if we needed 
specific advice on this pipeline and just submarine stuff, we had to go 
elsewhere for that anyway. So it was kind of tough to say, like to have, a 
mentor who wasn’t really in the program more than we were, I guess. It 
was tough. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…I felt like she was struggling to qualify and getting so much shit from 
the wardroom, that made it hard for her to be able to mentor us. …it was 
definitely hard for [my Supply Officer] to have that mentorship role 
because she was in the process of qualifying and a lot of the time she was 
trying to get her quals done because she was getting so much shit from 
everybody for not being qualified, just like the rest of us were. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I do think that the three girls that are there now, like in a big Navy way, 
they know that they can ask me questions and I can give them an answer 
that is not—I am not pulling it out of my ass or anything. But, they also 
know that I am not sub savvy…I don’t know anything about subs. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think senior JOs are more suited to mentor junior JOs and that’s the way 
it has been and that’s the way it should be. I think the problem initially 
was just getting a senior JO. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
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I think that a female nuke is better qualified to lead a female nuke than a 
female Supply Officer is. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Perhaps related to the fact that their intended mentor was not a submariner, some 
participants indicated that they sought guidance from male members who did have 
experience in the submarine force. In doing so, they realized they could find equally, if 
not more, effective mentorship from male crewmembers. When the mentorship role was 
filled by more senior male crewmembers, it was often viewed as supportive to integration 
efforts. 
I think at first I thought that you know I necessarily had to have a female 
mentor, but once I kind of got to know everybody I realized that wasn’t 
the case, that I got some really valuable insight from all the department 
heads and from the other JOs and from the CO and the XO. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
I think in terms of a professional role model, I look to the male 
submariners because I want to drive submarines, they have experience 
driving submarines and that’s really when I want to talk about my career 
path and my opportunities or should I go back to sea, they can give me the 
insight and the perspective that I kind of need to make that decision. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think at a certain point after you have had women onboard for a couple 
of years, like the boats that I have been on, I don’t think you have to have 
three people—three women onboard at all times. I don’t think you have to 
have a [female] Supply Officer. I do think that you should be able to 
interchange male and female very easily as long as you have some good 
people that are in the chain of command that can act as mentors—not just 
women, that also frustrates me. You know, some of my best mentors have 
been men. I don’t think it’s bad to have a female mentor, but don’t—it’s 
not one size fits all. So I don’t know, until they start really considering the 
force integrated—well, to me it’s not really integrated until they are able 
to interchange a male with a woman at any point in time. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
Many observations also discussed the continuance of the policy that a senior, 
female Supply Officer be required on all integrated crews. Concern was expressed as to 
the maintainability of this policy, and several participant opinions reflected beliefs that, 
not only should this no longer be a requirement, but also that maintaining the policy may 
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have damaging consequences. In this respect, the senior supply officer policy is seen as 
initially supportive, but may transition to a hindrance for the fleet. 
I think it’s unfortunate that we don’t have female 1120 role models in the 
submarine force, but we just are not there yet. So in terms of past initial 
integration, should we continue to have the Supply Officers? I think that 
the requirement is kind of crippling our expansion and I think it’s probably 
hurting the supply community as well in trying to provide such a large 
supply of women to the submarine force. (Interviewee, personal 
communication)   
You know, I think that I understand the submarine integration plan of 
having a Supply Officer with two nukes. I understand at the very 
beginning that was incredibly important, but I think at this point in time, 
especially on the already integrated boats, it’s not essential to keep that 
female Supply Officer there. I think it’s hurting all women, I mean, the 
Supply Corps, they really struggled with that too. A lot of those women, 
their tours are getting messed up because of it, but I think it affects the 
nukes as well.…they have limited themselves a lot in the instruction that 
they have written… (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Now to maintain it, I think it is…I don’t know how maintaining it will 
really work. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
The female Supply Officers were being extended just because someone 
from up on high said; thou shalt not replace female Supply Officers with a 
male Supply Officer, which is one, not part of the initial policy, two it’s 
not what you told everyone that you put onboard. So if you tell me that I 
am going to have a normal tour or in my case, my detailer said because of 
your seniority we are going to take you off earlier, you need to follow 
through with that.…I know their intention is good, but again I had those 
two other nuke JO females who at that point had been onboard for two 
years. There is no reason why you couldn’t have replaced me with a male. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
…initial integration I think it was wise to put that there. But, what they 
want is for us to stay there until they come back as a department head, 
which just isn’t going to happen. I don’t know of a single one of the first 
24 female nukes that are going back to the boat. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
For the initial integration efforts, the choice to have senior, female Supply 
Officers perform as mentors seems to have been a success. For crews that have been 
integrated for some time, however, the policy seems to be more of a handicap than a 
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benefit, at least in the views of the participants. It also seems apparent that female 
members of the submarine community feel the role of mentor should not be bounded by 
gender or rank.  
5. Supply Officers as Department Heads 
One final theme was specific to the Supply Officers, but had a great impact on 
their integration experience and is worthy of discussion. Many Supply Officers, as well 
as nuclear-trained officers, discussed difficulties that resulted from assigning more senior 
female officers, both in rank and experience, to the submarine environment. The Supply 
Officers selected for integration had all previously completed tours outside of the 
submarine community, and they had previously earned a warfare qualification from 
another community. When introduced to submarines, they filled a department head role 
as the command Supply Officer. While this position is considered a department head role 
on submarines, in practice, personnel filling this role are often treated as more of a 
division officer. This is likely due to the fact that, historically, the officer assigned to this 
role is a first-tour officer with no prior experience.  
I think it’s tough also to put a Lieutenant in a billet that’s usually for an 
Ensign or a JG. I think that was a tough position to put a brand new female 
who’s never been on a submarine before, because naturally we think of it 
as a department head job, and it is. But, I feel that, on a submarine, that 
Supply Officer job is not seen at the same level, so it’s hard for someone 
to go in and say, “I am supposed to be a department head Lieutenant, but 
everyone’s kind of treating me like I am an Ensign or I am a JG who’s not 
a department head.” (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…we all know how the Supply Officer is viewed in the wardroom…you 
are almost not treated as another department head in some respects. Right? 
So I think it was hard in that sense… (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
The new female Supply Officers immediately perceived this distinction, and it 
was troubling in that they felt no respect was paid to their previous Navy experience or 
their rank. 
I did have a lot of issues with integrating with my crew in general. That’s 
because, just I am not an Ensign and I am not a first-time Supply Officer. 
This wasn’t the first time I had been in a department head role. It wasn’t 
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the first time I had been around males. It wasn’t the first time I had done 
any of that stuff. It was just in a different environment. Being in a different 
environment versus not having that education at all is completely—they 
are two different aspects. Well, unfortunately my sub, my community—I 
say my community as in my submarine itself, my crew—saw it as the 
same thing.…We are quite different and I needed an upper chain of 
command support, they would normally not have to give, to make sure 
that the difference was expressed by their voices and by their commands 
and their actions on the boat. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I had a hard time with the whole department head/junior officer separation 
with such a small wardroom. I had a hard time convincing anybody that I 
wasn’t a junior officer. I am not—I wasn’t a first-tour officer, so don’t talk 
to me like I am an Ensign, which happened a lot. My first XO was 
notorious for leaving me off of emails where he wanted department head 
input on certain things. That I think comes more with rank versus male/
female integration. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
One final sentiment that was shared by some Supply Officers was the 
disconnection they felt from the wardroom. Many felt that they were very much alone in 
their role onboard. Again, this was a function of their job and their seniority. They were 
not only viewed as something less than a full department head but, due to their seniority, 
they were also separated from the social community of the other junior officers, which a 
typical male Supply Officer would normally fall into owing to their junior status.  
…because we are the non-submarine designated officer basically in 
general, it makes it very hard, and just to be a lone person…who is a 3100 
in a wardroom of 14 or 15 people. It’s very tough because they all have 
very different jobs and the fact that you don’t stand in-port watch, for 
example, makes you a very easy target. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
It may be different because most of them are males and they are Ensigns 
and so they group up with the JOs and they can talk amongst themselves 
and not necessarily talk to the other department heads, but they spend 
most of their time with the JOs. It is what you do. So they have more in 
camaraderie. More accepted. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
E. SUBMARINE CULTURE EFFECTS 
Another topic that garnered much discussion from the participants was the general 
culture of the submarine force. It is important to differentiate submarine culture from 
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command culture. While command culture is driven by individual leadership teams and is 
different on each boat, submarine culture is pervasive throughout the community. As 
discussed in Chapter III, this culture is shaped by the great value that is placed on 
competency and self-sufficiency, and it lends little forgiveness for incompetence, 
mistakes, and especially lethargy. Each individual is expected to be a self-starter, to pull 
her or his own weight, and to seek continual improvement. Constant training and 
qualification is a way of life.  
The first exposure to submarine culture, upon reporting, is typically related to the 
qualification process. Through this process, submariners gain adequate knowledge of ship 
systems and procedures to enable them to fill watch stander roles onboard. They are not 
able to support the rest of the crew on the watch bill, which rotates personnel through 
these watch stations, until they are certified to do so through the qualification process. 
For this reason, qualifications are emphasized early and often. In fact, upon check-in, 
many personnel are told they are already behind in their qualification progress, as one 
participant recalled: 
Monday was the first real workday and, at that point, it was your check-in 
sheets and making the rounds to meet everyone that you needed to and 
getting told that you are already behind in quals. That was the first real 
experience that we had with the crew. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
Some participants recalled their initial exposure to the submarine culture occurred 
even before reporting to their boat. One participant who worked with retired submariners 
gave the following account when asked if she had received any advice after being 
selected to participate in the Women in Submarines program:  
They gave me some advice. Really, all they told me, is they started calling 
me NUB. I needed to get qualified as soon as I could. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
Another recalled the following conversation with her father, who was a retired 
career submariner: 
You know, from the time I knew I was going to a boat, my dad said, “you 
are a NUB.” You know, so I knew that was going to happen. Bust your 
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butt, it’s not going to be very pleasant for the first, however long, because 
it’s a long process for everybody. The first year is usually not the most 
pleasant because you are so busy trying to qualify. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
New personnel are often referred to as NUBs, or Non-Useful Bodies, and are not 
considered full and useful members of the crew. Until qualified, officers and enlisted 
alike often get little sleep and are denied access to recreational spaces, are not allowed to 
have dessert following meals, are not allowed to join the crew for movies or other similar 
activities, as these are considered privileges. While most aspects of this culture are 
generally viewed as unpleasant, especially during the time before qualification is 
achieved, it can be argued that it is of great value to the community, as it establishes a 
strong work ethic and sets standards of what is expected at the outset. In more extreme 
cases, however, when left unchecked, it can lead to a toxic environment of disrespect, 
judgment, and inequality, and create deep-rooted feelings of resentment. 
The manner in which different elements of submarine culture are affected by 
command leadership and climate can also be considered supporting or hindering factors 
to the integration experience, but are discussed here as a separate topic to specifically 
explain the effects of this culture. Specific cultural themes, including the value of self-
sufficiency, effects on professionalism and respect, sleep deprivation, feelings of 
intellectual superiority, and implications of the submarine force’s attitudes toward self-
improvement are discussed in more detail in this section. In each of these categories, 
efforts to limit the harmful effects of these cultural elements were supportive to 
integration, while it was hindering when these elements were allowed to evolve to 
unprofessional levels. 
It is worth noting that submarine culture is not a gender-specific experience; it is 
encountered by all members of the community and affects everyone. The commentary 
presented in this section is from the perspective of the first female officers, but similar 
sentiments could easily be obtained from male crewmembers. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the influence of submarine culture is not gender-specific does not negate its importance 
in describing the integration process.  
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1. Self-Sufficiency 
During this process, the value that the culture places on self-sufficiency often 
becomes immediately apparent, as non-quals are often expected to dig into the books and 
self-teach, with little outside support. While this mentality is common, it is present in 
varying degrees. In the more extreme cases experienced by participants, this stood out as 
a major barrier: 
…as a JO, you are basically handed your book of six million quals and 
said go. You know? I will get you in line when you go astray. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think the answer to the submarine force for inadequacy of knowledge is 
to just give you more time to study. I did get more time to study, but that 
doesn’t work for me. That doesn’t help. “Here, read this.” Reading 
something doesn’t make sense to me. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
…you are giving her all this shit for not being qualified, but she’s coming 
to you like, “Hey, I just read this pub and I’m not—I’m trying to talk 
about it and you are telling her to go read it again. She just told you she 
read it.” So I felt like you know, [my Supply Officer] is a great person. 
But I felt like she was struggling to qualify and getting so much shit from 
the wardroom, that made it hard for her to be able to mentor us. 
(Interviewee, personal communication)   
If I ask for help, I am literally just asking you to help me. I don’t want 
the—I do not want you to tell me to go look it up because I didn’t ask you 
for that. This is just—once again, these are different cultures. So I came 
from a surface background.…If I asked someone for help, they would 
either say they didn’t have time, which is fine, or they would help when 
they could and that normally meant kind of by being hands on or teaching 
you. Like come and see this.…but submarine culture is more like go read 
it and then come ask me questions and then go read it again, come ask me 
some more questions. Then, maybe I will take you to the place where it is, 
but I am really just going to show you a diagram in front of the thing that 
you need to learn. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
“Okay, talk to so and so about this one and this one and then talk to this 
person about this, get them to initial and we will do a spot check and we 
will sign it off.” I would go and do that and I would spend a good 30 
minutes talking to this person and making sure I completely understood 
everything that I needed to know, I would get them to initial and then I 
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would go and do the spot check and he was like, “Okay, good.” Then 
wouldn’t sign it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
2. Respect and Professionalism 
Many participants discussed the utter lack of respect that was sometimes observed 
between qualified and un-qualified personnel. While a measure of professional pressure 
from qualified personnel is likely appropriate, in some cases, where the submarine culture 
is left un-checked, this relationship can devolve into something wholly unprofessional 
and damaging. These consequences were often difficult for the more senior women. 
Regardless of their prior experience and accomplishments, many felt they were not paid 
due respect because they were not qualified in submarines:  
I think the biggest—the most submariner thing that I guess I don’t like, is 
the…way that the qualified JOs talk to the nonquals. It’s like you are not a 
real person yet. You know, they never talked to me that way and I know I 
am in a different category, but if I had been one of the JOs to walk into 
something, I would have been like hell no. I am grown. You cannot talk to 
me like that, because I don’t care who you are. So that was a little 
disheartening, I guess. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…it was definitely a culture thing. They were definitely of the opinion of, 
“I got shit on when I was qualifying, so I am going to shit on you.” They 
just made every interaction a living hell. It got to the point where I 
wouldn’t go and ask for help…They would look at me and be like, “You 
are such a fucking idiot. How can you not understand that?”…I just 
stopped asking for help and I got horribly behind in my quals… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
…they treat everyone like that, which is a horrible culture. I don’t know 
how the submarine force will ever change it, if they will ever change it. As 
long as you are not a submariner, you are not a submariner until you get 
your pin. Until then, they refuse to respect you. (Interviewee, personal 
communication)   
Like the [guys] that showed up around the same time as me, they were 
great. They hated the way they were being treated as much as I hated 
it…nobody deserves to be treated like that…everybody’s a human being 
and deserves to be treated like a human being regardless of whether or not 
they have gold dolphins on their chest. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
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…in the submarine force, obviously you are not a whole lot of anything 
until you qualified dolphins…You know, I am not walking on this boat 
completely unqualified to do my job, but in their minds, until I am 
wearing dolphins, I am not really qualified to do anything, which 
definitely is a bit different than I had experienced in the past.…there was 
some disrespect in the fact that you don’t have your—you are not wearing 
dolphins, they don’t respect the experience that you already have in the 
Navy. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think it was hard for [my Supply Officer] because she was still trying to 
qualify and even though she’s been in for nine years now and she is 
qualified surface and aviation, the JOs, they still treated her like shit. Like 
I watched her go through the same stuff that I went through… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Another aspect of the submarine culture that became a point of conflict for the 
Supply Officers was the great value placed on qualifications and the ability for everyone 
on the crew to be able to support the watch rotation. Many of the Supply Officers wanted 
to be just that, Supply Officers. They felt, however, that on their submarine, they were 
often expected to first fill the role of a watch stander. 
…my job is not to be a Supply Officer, which for two years annoyed the 
piss out of me. My job was to be a watch stander. I would like to tell you 
that at the end of the day, I will get sent to jail, not because I wasn’t a 
good watch stander, but because I wasn’t doing my job as a Supply 
Officer. But I think that is a submarine culture too. (Interviewee, personal 
communication)   
I wanted to get there and be a Supply Officer. I didn’t want to be Battle 
Chop and they kept calling me—the master chief said I was going to be 
Battle Chop and I was like, nope. No desire to be Battle Chop. I just 
wanted to do my job and move on with life. Obviously my submarine had 
different expectations. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
3. Sleep Deprivation 
It is common for un-qualified personnel to sleep very little during their 
qualification process. Personnel with whom they are required to talk are often in different 
watch sections with different time rotations. This requires the person qualifying to stay up 
during the time they would normally be sleeping. Also, many qualified personnel are 
attuned to the amount of time non-qualified personnel spend sleeping, as a level of sleep 
deprivation is expected to advance qualification timelines. In fact, many new members 
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sleep very little voluntarily to get ahead in their progress and display that they are self-
motivated. Unfortunately, in some cases, this cultural mentality becomes warped to the 
point that qualified members can view sleep as a privilege and exert a level of pressure 
that becomes unprofessional.  
I didn’t expect to be awake so much when I was qualifying, I didn’t expect 
to do the two hours of sleep in two days and that be okay and almost be 
the expectation for somebody qualifying. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
[The XO] was like, “Why the hell haven’t you slept in two days?” I was 
like, “Because you all told me to get hot and get qualified and the only 
way to do that with this crazy eight-hour shift that we are now doing is to 
basically stay up all day because I have to talk to chiefs and they are each 
on a different watch section.” I am being told to go to sleep and now the 
other JOs are giving me shit because I am sleeping, which apparently is a 
privilege you only get when you get dolphins on this crew and it was—it 
was just a mess for me. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
We went out, did our deployment, I have never had so little sleep in my 
life, which was a really big thing for me. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
4. Intellectual Superiority and Constant Improvement 
Participants also discussed elements of the culture unrelated to the qualification 
process that they found troubling. Some perceived an attitude of intellectual superiority 
inherent in the community. This attitude was not only directed toward those who were 
not yet members of the submarine community, but also toward those who were 
considered junior members.  
…they kind of talk to you like they feel you are dumb and I just didn’t—it 
didn’t sit well with me. They have an ego, the sub guys have an ego…I 
really feel like they just think you are dumb. They think that you are 
dumber than them and they talk to you like that. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
So for me to not understand—I do remember one of the instructors saying 
in the beginning of class—I can’t remember what we were learning that 
day, but he was like, “For all my Supply Officers”—I don’t know why he 
said that, because there was only one and I had always been there—he is 
like, “Don’t worry about the course. You will get through it with lots of 
study. Supply Officers have always had a hard time understanding this and 
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I will try to dumb it down a little bit more so that you can understand it 
better.” (Interviewee, personal communication). 
…that’s how we are treated until we become department heads, we are 
pretty much treated like we are dumb as rocks. Obviously not, but you 
know that’s how we are treated.…JOs on my boat are generally seen as 
stupid and no matter how hard you work or what quality of work you give, 
it’s not because you did well. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
A final mentality discussed was the degree to which cultural ideals of constant 
improvement are applied. While this is certainly a valuable trait of the submarine 
community, it can sometimes be applied to such an extreme that it diminishes or 
completely disregards successful accomplishments. In these cases, the position that “we 
can always improve” is sometimes construed as “nothing is ever good enough.” While 
there may be a fine line between these two concepts, and this perception is likely driven 
heavily by individual personalities, it is still worth noting.  
I had moments of “oh my God, I did well.” Usually immediately crushed 
with, “you could have done better by—.” It’s like yes, I could have done 
better by—okay, but could you start it with, “You did that really well, next 
time add this and this.” Just not deconstruct every; you could have done 
better, just alright, add the next layer. Like always constructive, instead of 
destructive.…I feel like I spent my entire time here failing. I have 
evidence of things that I did well. I have examinations where I was 
directly involved and worked my ass off and we did well and I am not 
proud of any of it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
My XO’s first way of dealing with people was that tough love, and it 
wasn’t—Now it’s you know, he has a joke about only giving a JO one 
compliment a year. He has gotten to the point where instead of giving like 
direct compliments like, “You did a good job.” He will tell a JO they did a 
good job by telling them that they did a bad job for something that they 
did good. It’s so backwards and really hard to explain… (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
It should be emphasized that this discussion is not intended to cast a negative light 
on the submarine culture. Indeed, the submarine force owes much of its success to its 
culture and the positive effects it engenders. This discussion is valuable to the study as it 
highlights elements of the culture that, when left unchecked, were perceived as having ill 
effects on the integration experience, and that can be damaging overall. Perhaps a more 
valuable result of examining weaknesses is that success is often found in behaviors that 
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serve to address them. Many participants offered descriptions of experiences that tended 
to moderate the negative aspects. While many could be considered minor victories, they 
are examples that offer the greatest potential for learning. 
…my division was great. I know these guys [A Gang] are the hardest 
working guys on the boat and they, you know, if I have a question on 
something they are willing to be like, “yes, I can take ten minutes of my 
time and explain something to you.” (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I kind of struggled doing check-outs because I am a hands-on kind of 
person and I am not a book kind of person. So trying to look at a manual 
was a little bit intimidating for me, but I had—especially the nukes. They 
were like, “Hey, go and talk to so and so.” I would go and talk to so and so 
and they would kind of give me a break down and that was really helpful. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
So obviously a lot of the guys there, the more senior guys, helped me out a 
lot with quals and the more junior guys who had just kind of been where I 
was made me feel like I am not crazy, this is really just a crazy experience. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
For the first time in over two years someone more senior than me stopped 
me, while I was working, and said, “You are doing a real good job, thank 
you.”…I was so ecstatically, brightly happy. I had not been given any 
positive reinforcement in so long, it was like a ray of sunshine, shining 
through the entire ocean to reach down into my submarine and light up my 
day. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
F. PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL IMPACTS 
Another objective of this study is to explain qualitatively the ways in which the 
participants felt their experience affected their professional and personal lives. Not 
surprisingly, conversations often turned immediately toward the subject of retention. 
Aside from discussions related to retention, however, which are important and analyzed 
in detail in this section, most participants described the impacts of their experiences in 
terms of personal and professional growth and mentorship.   
1. Personal Growth 
Many participants described personal growth in terms of leadership, teamwork, 
assertiveness, and even sarcasm. Others expressed feelings of increased confidence and 
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maturity, and some recognized, through their experiences, that they were capable of 
achieving more than they had previously thought possible. 
I think—and this isn’t just because of being a female, but it proved to me 
that I could do more than I thought I could. I don’t know, just the amount 
of confidence I have now is way different. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
The submarine experience for me was just, generally, probably just the 
toughest thing.…it’s something I look back and I realize whatever I am 
going through right now, if I can go through submarines, I can go through 
this. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think being a submarine officer certainly taught me how to assert myself 
and taught me some confidence. It taught me how and when to yell at 
people if that was necessary.…So I think my personality has certainly 
changed a little bit, just kind of, you have to be a little bit crazy to be a 
submariner, so I think I developed a little bit more of that. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
It’s made me a better officer, I will give you that. Made me a better leader, 
in terms of the fact that I didn’t want to get involved in the bigger picture, 
but being on a submarine that kind of becomes negated in being involved 
on the larger scale and knowing what’s going on in other departments and 
divisions. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
…my job is senior advisor to the captain and a mentor to JOs. That 
actually helped me to get even more mature, much more mature than I 
used to be. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think, you know, it was probably one of the hardest things I have ever 
done and I definitely woke up some mornings thinking…”I don’t want to 
go to work today.” I think kind of pushing through that experience and, by 
the end of it, I kind of came into my own…I think that’s kind of 
empowering to say that I went from this point to where I didn’t think I 
could do this to, you know, really enjoying what I was doing. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Some impacts were perceived to be slightly less positive: 
I would say that I am probably a lot more cynical than I was. Some of the 
things that the submarine force, I guess, instilled in me, isn’t necessarily a 
bad thing. I have a lower tolerance for people not doing their jobs, which 
you know it’s not necessarily a bad thing.…I think personally it has been a 
lot more stressful, made me more cynical and critical. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
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The experience was also seen, on a professional level, as opening doors to new 
opportunities and serving as a catalyst for self-reflection: 
…having been on a submarine tour which was so personally tough, made 
me realize that I have a lot of personal shortfalls that I need to look back 
and rethink about and reassess. So I think it was a great learning 
experience for me, is what I would say. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I think that I learned some really valuable tools about leadership and 
teamwork that I didn’t know before. I also just think it was really fun and 
even the hardest times…I got some really great tools from it that I hope I 
can use later when I get out of the Navy. I mean professionally, I guess, I 
have a lot of really great mentors now, that I honestly didn’t think I would 
ever consider as my mentor before, just considered them as my enemy, but 
yes. So I think I learned from some really great people and, professionally, 
I hoped that I developed some things that I could continue to use in the 
near future. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Except for the most extreme negative cases, a consensus was found among the 
participants that they had learned valuable lessons. Although their experiences were not 
always pleasant, participants reported gaining confidence by overcoming adversity and 
becoming more effective and professional leaders.   
2. Mentorship 
Many participants expressed that their personal and professional lives were 
enhanced in the area of mentorship. First, they indicated that they established valuable 
and lasting mentor relationships with others.  
I mean professionally, I guess, I have a lot of really great mentors now, 
that I honestly didn’t think I would ever consider as my mentor before, 
just considered them as my enemy, but yes. So I think I learned from some 
really great people and, professionally, I hoped that I developed some 
things that I could continue to use in the near future. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
Second, participants often realized that they themselves developed into mentors 
for the other female officers. A common opinion was that, once they had been on board 
for a sufficient time to learn the culture and earn their submarine qualification, they could 
easily fill the mentorship role for newly reporting officers. Not only could they fill the 
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role, they were perhaps better be able to mentor than a senior Supply Officer, since they 
had now successfully transitioned through all the stages that newly reporting female JOs 
would soon go through. Some participants recalled that, as senior, qualified JOs, they 
indeed felt that they were the ones who actually ended up filling this role, which was very 
empowering. 
I felt like we did fill that role. Our Supply Officer was extremely bogged 
down and just trying to run her department, so as new females came 
onboard, you know, we served—we kind of served that role. I felt like we 
became the mentors for the new females. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I think it’s valuable to have a senior woman on there, but at the point 
where one of the JOs has been onboard for you know, a year and a half, 
two years—I don’t necessarily think that the Supply Officer needs to be a 
woman anymore. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think that as these female Ensign 1170s mature into 1120s with three 
years on the boat, they kind of become more natural mentors to the new 
women showing up. Mostly, just because professionally and personally 
they can relate to them better. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
3. Retention 
Retention is a topic of great interest to the Navy and the submarine force. Until 
now, the sub force has been an all-male service, so the topic of female retention is 
understandably a rather foreign one. While parallels may be drawn and lessons learned 
from other integrated components of the Navy, there are still unique elements of the 
submarine community that will undoubtedly have impacts on female retention, for which 
there is no surrogate to look to for explanation. Few topics in this study elicited as many 
thoughts and opinions as the topic of female retention. Unfortunately, most of the 
commentary suggests that the submarine force faces a challenge in retaining female 
sailors. As one participant observed, “At this point they would have expected, I think, ten 
percent of the first group to sign contracts and none of us have signed contracts yet.” 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
Of the nine nuclear officer participants in this study, none had a firm intention of 
returning to submarines. Five have either already left the Navy or have plans to get out, 
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while four were undecided whether they would remain on active duty. Of the four who 
were undecided, two indicated that they were leaning toward separation and two plan to 
seek lateral transfers out of the submarine community, if they choose to stay in. Supply 
Officers assigned to submarines only typically have one tour of duty, but were asked 
whether they would have made the same decision to join the submarine community, or, 
given the option, if they would go back. Of the six Supply Officers, three indicated they 
would still make the same decision or go back and three said they would not. 
Many participants offered an opinion regarding the issues that will pose the 
greatest problems for retention of submarine women. These opinions fall into two general 
categories. First, many participants indicated that problems with work-life balance and 
family planning would be the greatest issue affecting their retention. This issue was seen 
as especially important for families in which both members are in the military. While 
many female service members in other communities have children, most participants 
recognized unique traits of the submarine community that they felt contributed toward 
attrition, such as the very rigid, lock-step career paths for submariners and the high-
tempo deployment rotation. 
…the family planning part nobody’s really talked about, because most of 
the women—myself not included—are married or in a very serious 
relationship, so between a two-year training pipeline, is what it’s turned 
into, changing the DIVO tour to three full years instead of 32 months, and 
then still requiring us to be at SOAC by seven years, you have given me 
less than two years on my shore duty to have a family. Then if I wait until 
after my department head tour, I am already 34 years old.…I think they 
are confused about why none of the first group have even signed contracts. 
…I mean for me personally, not being married, the decision whether or 
not to sign a contract right now is almost a decision whether or not to—it’s 
a decision to choose the Navy over having a family. But even if I am not 
sure right now on whether or not I want to have a family, I also 100% 
know that I would regret not having a family more than I would regret 
getting out of the Navy. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
So as far as my career in the Navy, I am a little bit undecided right now. I 
think that my plan is to get out of the Navy and to go to school to get my 
Master’s.…I think that the Navy has done some really awesome things to 
allow people to kind of have a family and sort of take a break, but 
obviously that doesn’t exist yet for the submarine force…So it’s just really 
tough and it’s really fast paced and I think that it would be really difficult 
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for—definitely it would be difficult for us to both stay in and start a 
family.…the model doesn’t look like it’s going to work out. How the 
Navy could kind of affect that, I think that where the Navy has kind of 
advanced in other programs in the flight program or the surface warfare, it 
obviously hasn’t gotten that far with submarines yet. I think the timeline to 
get to SOAC is very strict…you know, they say that shore duty is the time 
when you can start a family and whatnot, but when you are a woman it’s a 
little bit more difficult to say, you know, that you will just have a kid and 
then you can go on deployment. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I can’t create a scenario or manipulate our schedules where my husband 
and I don’t have to do three or four years long distance to make that work. 
We have already done four years of that, so we are done. (Interviewee, 
personal communication)  
Since I have been in the military, there has never been a time long enough 
for me to even consider having a kid…and then the first time you get a 
chance is after your first JO tour when you are supposed to get a master’s 
degree and do some sort of random shore tour for the Navy and it’s maybe 
a year and a half long.…given the way that they do the timing and the 
career progression and all of that, how lock step it is, there is no room for 
them to do it. They have locked themselves in a little itty bitty cage and 
thrown away the key. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I really enjoyed the leadership opportunities that I had…but I am not sure 
the submarine force is ready for women that want to have a family life. 
Honestly, that’s what my decision to stay in or not is going to come down 
to, is my ability to be a mom and be a successful mom as well as a 
successful submariner, especially being dual military.…I would love to 
see the submarine force get to the point where a dual military couple can 
have kids and stay in and they are willing to make accommodations for 
that. I am just not sure I am ready to be the one to pave the way for that. I 
just think they need to realize that it’s not just a few that this affects, but 
this is truly probably one of the biggest issues that women face at some 
point in their career. All of those women will face it at some point in their 
career of having to choose work over family. I think the thing that the 
military doesn’t do a very good job at, is they don’t understand that this is 
different for men and women. I think so many times they try to lump 
everyone as we are equal, we are equal. Well, we are, until you get to a 
point and when it comes to family life, the reality is I have to carry a child 
over nine months and that makes me different.…especially with the 
submarine force talking about nuclear gates—it is not possible for both my 
husband and I to just leave a child at three months old and go on six 
months deployments. That’s just not going to be a possibility. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
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[The COB] did tell me once that he was really impressed with the first one 
that got her fish and how he hoped that she would stay in because 
someone like her was what the force really needed in terms of a first 
woman kind of rising through the ranks. She’s still around. At this point, 
it’s really the ball is in the Navy’s court.…the Navy needs the women 
more than the women need the Navy. If they don’t make some kind of 
accommodations to figure out when a woman can have a family or how 
that’s going to work in the submarine force, especially with dual military, 
that she is going to leave.…They don’t know how to talk about it at all. I 
think that’s definitely something that they should work on or else they are 
really going to limit themselves and they are going to lose a lot of really 
good people. I mean they already are.…there’s no cushion in the 
submarine force’s progression—career progression.…So I think that’s the 
reason why a lot of submariner males are getting out too.…I mean the 
whole reason we started allowing women on submarines, bar the whole 
because it’s the right thing to do, is they needed more people because their 
attrition rates are high and they are having a hard time retaining people. So 
they just throw more bodies at the problem. Well, how about you look at 
the root cause, which usually the submarine force is really good at doing, 
figuring out the root cause and address that? The root cause is people 
haven’t taken into account the people factor and how to balance 
professional and personal life without screwing up someone’s career. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
The other main category for comments on retention problems relates to the nature 
of the job itself and the impact of poor command climates. Many participants indicated 
that the highly demanding and rigorous characteristics of the submarine environment 
were simply unattractive and un-motivating. Other comments revolved around concern 
for how people were generally treated in the organization. It is clear that the commentary 
in this category is largely driven by individual command cultures and climates. This, too, 
is a useful observation, as it highlights the extent to which a poor command climate can 
affect retention efforts.  
I think it’s also the submarine community, because…I have a lot of friends 
in other communities and I realized that the unhappiness that a lot of me 
and my other officers had, it’s not normal.…yes, it was a lot more intense 
and a lot more stressful than a lot of the rest of the Navy. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
I still thought I was going to be a career sailor when I first got to my boat. 
I spent the first year on my boat still hopeful, happy go lucky, just you 
know what—it’s going to get better. It’s going to get better. You can’t stay 
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this awful.…It was rough, but I always held out this hope that, you know, 
once we did our pushups and we made ourselves better people and we did 
the job, that the people would start acting like human beings to each other 
and that never happened. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I see the guys, they are there until sometimes 6, 7, 8 o’clock at night as 
department heads and I just don’t see that—that’s not going to appeal to a 
female with a family. It’s the culture that we live in. You know, the female 
typically takes the role as the caregiver and it’s just not—it’s just not 
acceptable to a lot of people. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
As far as the camaraderie, I got it on the enlisted side. I did not see it at all 
on the officer side, which sucked because those were my—the people who 
I was supposed to be interacting with the most and learning from and all I 
learned from them is that I didn’t want to be like them. (Interviewee, 
personal communication) 
So I had really high hopes when I got in. I wanted to make positive 
changes in the lives of my sailors. Instead of being empowered to do so as 
a junior officer on my boat, the point in time when I was supposed to have 
the most effect on their lives, I was told that I couldn’t be what I perceived 
what was necessary to do that positive effect.…They are some of the 
smartest, best people I have ever worked with in my life. It’s a culture that 
I see pervading like all of the submarine fleet here.…It’s like this endless 
frustration that I can’t change it, I can’t make it better.…They work 
harder, longer hours and are treated more awfully than I have seen 
anywhere else. It’s indentured servitude.…I can’t do that. I can’t go on to 
be a department head and then treat people like that and I can’t go on to be 
an XO and treat people like that. I can’t go on to be a CO and treat people 
like that.…I can’t imagine anybody staying. It’s just—there’s a lot less 
tolerance in most women than there are men. (Interviewee, personal 
communication)  
…I don’t regret being in the Navy. I wish there were things I could 
change. I wish I could smack some of the people that were on that boat 
and tell them that they are horrible people because you—no person should 
be treated like that. So I mean I went from wanting to spend 20 years in 
the Navy to wanting nothing to do with it for a good period of time. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
While the subject of retention is a hot topic throughout the Navy, the submarine 
community faces its own unique challenges. Chief among these is meeting the needs of 
the force while attempting to accommodate the personal or family needs of its members. 
Second, but no less important, is the nature of the job itself and certain aspects of the 
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culture the organization creates. Perceived problems in the submarine culture are perhaps 
the easiest to address, since they can be effectively mitigated by good leadership and a 
positive command climate.  
G. BENEFITS OF WOMEN’S INTEGRATION 
In conducting analyses of the interviews, several themes emerged that provide 
valuable insight into the benefits of the integration process. Much of the commentary on 
the following subjects comes in the form of participant opinions, generated by personal 
experiences, and should prove useful in evaluating current and future policy decisions.  
1. Diversity 
A major benefit typically attributed to gender integration within the submarine 
community is the larger pool of talent available to the Navy. Other, less tangible, benefits 
are not as often perceived or discussed. Many participants expressed their insights 
regarding these perceived benefits, which are both interesting and potentially valuable for 
further research.   
I think the major benefit is that the fleet gets access to very, very qualified 
and bright, talented females, which otherwise would never be eligible to 
serve. So that by itself is a major value proposition. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
I think my personality, just being a woman, I probably had a different 
operating style, a different way of seeing things and doing things. So we 
talk about the benefits of diversity and bringing different viewpoints to the 
table and I think in some ways that could be really helpful to a command 
climate. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I really think women bring a new perspective to the submarine force. 
Submariners tend to be really type A, in the box people that do everything 
the same way unless a collision happens, they are not going to change the 
way they are doing it. But, I think we bring a new perspective to the table 
of there is a better way to do this and it is more effective and here is an 
effective way to solve this problem that you didn’t even know existed. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
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2. Crew Professionalism 
Many participants spoke of the positive effect integration had on command 
climate and culture, which is an advantage that is somewhat less obvious. The sentiment 
was generally that having women on board tended to promote a healthier, more 
professional atmosphere, which benefited the crew as a whole.  
…most of the guys actually said that it was for the better, the boat’s a 
better place…So it’s hard to think that you personally are the impetus for 
change, but that’s what my COB—my COB thought that there was a 
change in the professionalism and maturity on the boat. So he felt like, 
you know—he felt like he saw a change in the guys and kind of just the 
higher performance level and a higher standard with having female JOs. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
It wasn’t as harsh of an environment in the wardroom after we showed up 
from what people say. I definitely got asked for a lot of relationship advice 
after I showed up onboard on how to deal with things. But, I think in some 
senses, they were happy to have kind of a different perspective in the 
wardroom. I do think women provided creative problem solving 
element…In some respects, I think that was a really good thing for the 
wardroom to have. I think it definitely made us a better ship. I talked a 
little bit already about that, becoming more civilized in the wardroom. I 
definitely think that we just provide a softer touch…there’s no better way 
to say it than just that guys won’t destroy each other quite as much when 
we are around. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think that women just react differently to things. The first time I cried…I 
think he just realized that he couldn’t just yell at me like he always did to 
the guys. So I think it provided definitely some leadership challenges to 
the chain of command… (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I had somebody, one of the guys tell me this, things are much more 
civilized with you onboard. It’s more professional, you know gender had 
no consideration for people, but people weren’t disrespected. You know, 
when you go into a crew of all males, it’s just part of the culture, they put 
people down a lot to make them more motivated to accomplish 
something…So I think people realized that putting someone down is not 
cool. Disrespecting someone just because they learn a different way or 
they have a certain opinion about something, that adds to the diversity in 
your available thought processes onboard…Things are a little nicer 
onboard. So I think that’s a positive effect. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
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I do hope that the culture or anything became a little bit more positive 
because of the result of females coming onboard. Maybe the fact that a 
little bit more cordial, little bit less crudeness onboard…I had a couple of 
senior chiefs come up to me that by the end of that tour...”this is a better 
place to work and I really want to go back to an integrated boat.” 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
3. Communication 
A final, common perception was that integration improved communication flow 
on the boat at all levels, from junior enlisted personnel to senior leadership. According to 
participants, better communication provided many benefits, from improving the 
effectiveness of watch teams to aiding in issue resolution to simply creating more 
comfortable personal relationships. 
…towards the end of our time there, I felt like I knew way too much about 
my sailor’s lives. Like they would come and tell me things about problems 
with their wives and medical issues and you know, their grandfather was 
whatever. You know, that may have just been my personality and women 
talk more than guys do, you know you joke, you laugh, you communicate 
and they feel comfortable coming and confiding in you, but I think they 
certainly did confide in us to a much greater extent, which in turn I think 
was actually really helpful to the chain of command.…I think that was 
probably useful just that there was probably a higher level of 
communication flowing back and forth between some of the enlisted 
sailors and the junior officers than there would have been had females not 
been in the mix. (Interviewee, personal communication)   
Another big achievement I would say for me was actually guys coming 
and talking to me about their personal issues, their professional issues, or 
marital issues. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I also think as leaders we tend to be more nurturing, which I think is very 
helpful for the young enlisted, especially, that we care a lot more about 
people just in general. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think it opened the lines of communication between people a little more 
when we got here. I think it was a little stifled before, but you know I 
don’t care how low or high you are, like if I have something I need to say 
to somebody, I just go up to somebody…That definitely made it to where 
people would communicate with each other more about different 
things…guys don’t feel threatened by us. They don’t feel like we are 
going to tell them that they are stupid for telling us that we are wrong, or 
telling us that there might be a better way to do this…So like, those 
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moments were good. The communication, I have seen it more with the 
male JOs now that I have been doing it for a while and I think some of it is 
because they saw me do it. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
While many of these perceived benefits might be less tangible, they are no less 
important. Their implications should not be overlooked, as they may very well lead to a 
more effective force overall. 
4. Insight for Enlisted Integration 
Another topic of interest is participant opinions regarding the impending 
integration of female enlisted members within the submarine force. Since this topic is 
well beyond the scope of this study, little analysis was actually conducted. The following 
opinions are simply offered for consideration with the hope that some may prove useful 
in informing future decisions regarding the enlisted integration process. 
I think they will have their own challenges. I am not naïve to think that 
there weren’t portions of the boat that I didn’t see and there are definitely 
things that a prettier picture was painted in front of me or even other 
officers face than the enlisted women are going to see. They are definitely 
going to—any sort of privacy that the guys may have held on to during the 
integration is going to be gone. Right? So I think they are going to have 
their own challenges. I think the female chiefs are going to have a lot of 
challenges too, as they not only try to be a chief, but also try to learn a 
whole new thing. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Whether or not I think the submarine force is ready, I think that as long as 
the process for getting submarines ready is at least the same as it was for 
us, the program will be fine. I think where it starts to get a little grey is 
when people start to relax and maybe the first wave has gone through, but 
now there is the second wave and if not everybody gets the same training 
that the first group gets…obviously it’s going to be tougher because the 
berthing situation is different. As long as they keep that kind of training 
model, I think it will be fine. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
Stop making it a big deal. Oh my God, get it out of the news, stop making 
it a big deal. Stop making announcements and proclamations and when it 
does happen, you talk to the boat that it’s happening on…and send them 
on their way. (Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think one of the big things that helped with the integration was that 
distinct officer and enlisted boundary. So you know, even if it was maybe 
what he said was inappropriate because he is a male saying it to a female, 
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but was it inappropriate from an enlisted to an officer? You could always 
fall back on that and have that as your metric. You are not going to have 
that with—or you may not have that with the female integration. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I think they need to do it and overall it will be a positive thing, but I think 
they also have to handle it carefully right at the start…The way I heard 
some of the guys kind of talk to me about like having an enlisted woman 
onboard, they didn’t—like I don’t think their perceptions are quite right on 
what it would be like. So I would say I think that needs to be handled well 
in the initial like integration of enlisted women. (Interviewee, personal 
communication) 
The enlisted women integration, I don’t think that it’s going to go the way 
that they think it will go, because I don’t feel that there has been long-term 
planning. I feel like it has been short-term planning. I do think enlisted 
women should be able to serve on submarines, however until you set up a 
process that looks at long-term effects by one, looking at the long-term 
effects of female officers, I don’t think that you are going to get what you 
think you are going to get… I don’t like seeing anyone set up for 
failure…I think not having a long-term viability discussion is setting 
people up for failure in the long run…it will put a lot of extra pressure on 
the women that are the firsts, just like it did the female officers that we 
were the firsts. I would have liked to have seen them integrate the chief’s 
quarters first. I think that’s a tough organization to really crumble, but I 
think if you had more people, more women in the goat locker, I think that 
would really set up your enlisted integration better. Just like I think having 
initially that senior Supply Officer was kind of important—the ones that 
did have senior Supply Officers, just for a command climate aspect. I 
don’t know, more experience I think equals better perspective. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
If the command approaches it the way the command approaches it where 
these are just sailors getting here, ready to go, to work on quals, to do the 
things that they are supposed to do, then it’s going to be just fine. If the 
command approaches it and people are allowed to walk around saying, 
“Oh my God, the females are here,” then it poisons the entire—it poisons 
the entire process. You have already poisoned the tree, if that makes sense. 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
I just felt like we, the females, didn’t really talk about our experience 
when we were actually assigned to our boats often enough or with the 
operational tempo. I get it, like ship’s schedule, I get it. But, I just felt like 
we didn’t have enough time to even talk about or discuss our issues when 
we were actually going through the process. So that was…something that I 
wish we could have done better. We should have done better, I think. I 
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mean at least we are discussing it now, but it is almost like looking back… 
(Interviewee, personal communication) 
H. CONCLUDING NOTE 
The rich data set of interviews offers many possible answers to the questions 
initially drafted for this research. In analyzing the interviews, only a fraction of themes 
were selected for further discussion due to the limited scope of the present study. Topics 
listed by research question are shown in Table 2. The next chapter discusses possible 
areas for further research. 











































Major Impacts     
Different Treatment 5 8 13 86.7% 
Command Climate/Leadership 4 8 12 80.0% 
Warm-Up Periods 5 9 14 93.3% 
Overtraining Effects Training 4 5 9 60.0% 
Supply Officers as DHs 5 3 8 53.3% 
Supply Officer as JO Mentors 4 9 13 86.7% 
Submarine Culture Effects     
Zero Defect Culture 1 3 4 26.7% 
Personal/Professional 
Impacts     
Crew Professionalism 3 6 9 60.0% 
General Retention Concerns 2 7 9 60.0% 
Work/Life Balance Concerns 3 8 11 73.3% 
Benefits of Integration     




In 2009, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral 
Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, began the campaign that would allow 
women officers to serve aboard Ohio-class submarines. Within six months, the policy 
change was vetted through Congress, and the first women submarine officers were 
selected in the spring of 2010. In 2011, the first women officers reported aboard four 
Ohio-class submarines; today, over 100 female officers are serving on SSBNs, SSGNs, 
and Virginia-class attack submarines. 
This study was designed using qualitative research methods and undertaken to 
capture and learn from the lived experiences of the first women to integrate into the 
previously all-male submarine force. The study was designed and carried out by 
researchers who were themselves members of the submarine force, one a 15-year, prior 
enlisted submarine line officer, and the other, one of the initial female Supply Officers 
selected for integration. Fifteen female officers who were among the first group to 
initially integrate into the force, and whose identities will remain anonymous, voluntarily 
participated in the study. Semi-structured, guided interviews were conducted with the 
participants to gather data. Interviews were transcribed and retained as part of this study 
to provide a rich data set to support future research projects.  
Interviews were analyzed by the researchers and used to frame conclusions and 
answer the main research questions: How would the first women to join the submarine 
force generally describe their integration experience? What factors supported or hindered 
their integration? What was the character of the organizational culture and how did it 
affect their experiences? Have their experiences affected them, professionally or 
personally and, if so, how? What do the participants see as the benefits of their 
integration? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
The overall research question, how do participants generally describe their 
experience, was first analyzed in terms of quality. Results of this analysis indicate that 
 96 
two participants described their integration experience as excellent, six as good, three as 
neutral, and five as poor. Attention then turned toward understanding and describing the 
factors that resulted in, and could possibly explain, what shaped these experiences. The 
analysis served to address the remaining research questions and revealed five major 
hindering or supporting factors that affected integration: differential treatment, command 
climate and leadership, socialization periods, supply officers as dual purpose mentors, 
and supply officers as department heads. The role that the general submarine culture 
played in the integration process was also analyzed and described. This was followed by 
a brief discussion of personal and professional impacts and the benefits of integration. 
Differential Treatment. It became clear that the participants in general were all 
very aware of, and sensitive to, treatment that they felt was different from that of their 
male counterparts. They expressed strong desires to be treated as equals. Situations and 
climates that tended to promote such equality were seen to greatly enhance the 
integration experience, while instances of perceived inequality were seen as detrimental. 
Even instances that may be considered relatively minor, or events that would normally be 
considered good, such as special recognition, were often pointed out in the interviews as 
differential treatment, indicating the sensitivity of this topic. 
Command Climate and Leadership. It was widely agreed among participants that 
individual command climates, as established by command teams, had by far the greatest 
impact on the integration process. Three main elements were seen as supporting a good 
command climate conducive to integration efforts. Chief among these was the extent that 
command leadership promoted an atmosphere of professionalism and mutual respect at 
all levels. It was also beneficial to the experience when leadership somewhat 
downplayed, or prevented, excess attention on integration events as an anomaly, and 
promoted feelings of normalcy. Participants appreciated command environments where 
they were viewed as just another officer, there to do their job. Finally, it was considered 
important to promoting a positive command climate when leadership took an active role 
in the integration process, both in terms of prompt attention to issues and as an interested 
party in the process itself. Conversely, participants felt that the experience was damaged 
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when leadership was perceived as being disinterested in the process or, in some cases, the 
women themselves.  
Socialization Periods. Nearly every participant, in one way or another, discussed 
the initial socialization or warm-up period between the crew and the newly reported 
women. It was generally described as a time when everyone was very standoffish and 
tended to avoid the female officers, adding to feelings of inequality and creating 
communication problems. Most understood that this period was inevitable, but in some 
instances its duration and severity were perceived to have been limited by good command 
climate and other efforts by leadership. These instances were seen as positive to the 
integration efforts. Additionally, many participants believed that, although useful, the 
initial training required for crews to become certified for integration was rather excessive 
and too centered around SAPR-type topics rather than other topics that would have been 
more useful, such as procedures for entering female staterooms and head facility usage.  
Supply Officers as Dual-Purpose Mentors. It was nearly unanimous across all 
interviews that the assignment of a senior supply officer with prior Navy experience was 
valuable to the initial integration efforts. Supply officers were able to serve as mentors to 
the junior nuclear female officers as they could provide general advice regarding 
interactions and conduct in the military environment and serve as a sounding board. It 
was also noted that the supply officers filled an important mentorship role for the 
command team regarding integration issues and communication with the new female 
junior officers, which was seen as supportive to the process. The utility of the supply 
officer as a mentor was limited, however, because they lacked experience in not only the 
submarine environment but also in the nuclear power job aspects that dominated much of 
the lives of the unrestricted line female officers. In fact, supply officers themselves were 
struggling to learn this new culture and become qualified watch standers, further negating 
their roles as mentors. Many nuclear-trained participants found it most helpful when they 
were able to find mentorship from male officers who had experienced what they were 
going through. Furthermore, the supply officers and nuclear officers both recognized the 
fact that, once fully qualified, a female junior officer could easily step into the role of 
mentor for newly reporting females, and be more effective. 
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Supply Officers as Department Heads. One final major theme was specific to the 
female Supply Officers. Many expressed aggravation with the integration process, driven 
by their position on board as a department head and their prior Navy experience. The 
Supply Officer is a department head position by title, but typically the officer assigned to 
this role is a first-tour Supply Officer with no prior experience. For the women in 
submarines program, however, female Supply Officers were selected who had already 
completed previous tours and had already qualified in a warfare designation outside the 
submarine force. Because Supply Officers are typically first-tour junior officers on 
submarines, combined with the fact that they have not yet earned their submarine 
qualification, they are sometimes perceived as more of a division officer in the wardroom 
than a department head. This perception often led to feelings of lack of respect for their 
seniority and prior accomplishments. At the same time, instances when they were given 
support by command leadership to emphasize their role as a department head were 
viewed as most helpful to the integration process. 
Submarine Culture. The submarine community has a very strong and pervasive 
culture that values self-sufficiency, personal motivation, constant improvement, and 
proficiency, and it is extremely unforgiving of anything perceived as incompetence. New 
personnel are not welcomed unconditionally, but must instead earn acceptance by 
demonstrating their competence. This culture is not in itself harmful and indeed serves as 
a driving force in the success of the community. It does, however, have the potential to 
lead to a command climate that becomes unprofessional, where mutual respect is no 
longer highly valued and new personnel are given very little, if any, outside support. If 
left unchecked, it can lead to a toxic environment of disrespect, judgment, and inequality. 
Some participants had negative experiences due to submarine culture, while others had 
more positive experiences because good command leadership promoted climates of 
respect and professionalism, serving to moderate this culture. The latter situation was, 
perhaps obviously, considered helpful to integration efforts.  
Personal and Professional Impacts. Except in cases where participants viewed 
their experiences as extremely poor, perceived impacts revolved around three main 
topics: growth from their experience, mentorship discussions, and thoughts on future 
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retention. First, the sentiments regarding effects on personal and professional lives 
centered on positive learning experiences in leadership and teamwork, as well as feelings 
of increased confidence, assertiveness and maturity. Most participants believed that they 
were generally better off from their experiences and that they had realized their 
previously unrecognized potential. Second, most participants agreed that the policy of 
having a more senior female officer with prior Navy experience provide a mentor role for 
junior nuclear-trained officers was advantageous and a good model with which to start. 
Many also agreed, however, that once nuclear-trained female officers become fully 
qualified in submarines, they could easily step into this role, perhaps more effectively, 
and the requirement for a female Supply Officer should be lifted. Finally, as a 
professional impact, much discussion included future retention of female officers. In this 
study, no participants have yet committed to returning to the submarine fleet, and many 
offered their opinions on the matter. The largest barrier to retention among participants is 
problems created by the high tempo, lock-step career progression of submarine officers, 
and family-planning concerns. While there are significant challenges for this process, and 
more will inevitably occur in the future, the participants provided many success stories 
and much can be learned from them. 
Benefits of Integration. The participants discussed several perceived advantages 
of crew integration, some of which have perhaps not yet been recognized by the force. 
Some major benefits discussed included the obvious increase in both population and 
talent from which the submarine force can recruit members, and the value added by 
having greater diversity of thought and points of view on submarine crews. Some less 
obvious benefits that were perceived by some participants included the creation of a more 
positive, healthy, and professional atmosphere on board integrated crews, and better 
communication flow at all levels, which would in turn lead to greater efficiency and 
overall effectiveness. These potential benefits deserve further analysis as they could have 
powerful implications for the submarine force if proven accurate. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The following suggestions for further future research were inspired by this study.  
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One participant suggested that the potential may exist for an increase in problems 
related to gender integration. Her reasoning included the relaxing of standards over time 
and her observation that new personnel reporting aboard after the initial integration had 
received no specialized training whatsoever to prepare them to enter a gender-integrated 
community. Also, within approximately two years, everyone who had received any 
training specific to integration had departed due to their normal rotation schedule. The 
present study could be extended to include more recent groups of women who have 
reported to crews that have been integrated for some time, comparing experiences and 
opinions for trend analysis. The continued study could use the same methodology and 
structure developed here, with increased focus on analysis. 
The present study could also be used as a model to assess the experiences of the 
first group of enlisted women to integrate on submarines, as well as the first group of 
female officers assigned to fast-attack submarine crews. This would be useful as it would 
again capture the lived experiences for further research, but also allow assessment of 
similarities and differences across different submarine cultures including SSBNs, SSGNs, 
attack submarines, and the enlisted community. Further, a study could be conducted to 
determine why differences may exist and what elements could be leveraged moving 
forward. Significant differences and similarities would likely be found in these studies, 
and the findings could have important implications in setting a course for future 
integration efforts. 
During the initial phases of topic development, the researchers conducted some 
analysis regarding the pre-integration procedures from other countries with integrated 
submarine crews. Although there are differences in the mission sets and deployment 
times between countries, existing evidence suggests that setting the tone of a command 
climate prior to integration can enhance buy-in from the community as well as from the 
families of service members. Australia, for example, apparently focused more effort on 
the socialization aspect and command climate elements that promoted respect and fair 
treatment. This is especially interesting in that some countries have worked toward fully 
integrated berthing and sanitary facilities on submarines that are similar to United States 
fast-attack space limitations. 
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Finally, an area of interest for future research revolves around the advantages 
perceived by some participants. Specifically, that integrated crews may potentially be 
more effective overall due to a more professional command climate and increased 
communication flow. The researchers suggest conducting a study to evaluate crew 
effectiveness between integrated and non-integrated crews. Some potential metrics for 
measurements could include inspection grades, nuclear and non-nuclear crew test scores, 
numbers of incidents or critiques, and personnel discipline issues. Other metrics are also 
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APPENDIX C.  NAVADMINS ON ENLISTED INTEGRATION 
UNCLASSIFIED/ 
ROUTINE 
R 211425Z JAN 15 PSN 507838H31 
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC 
TO NAVADMIN 




SUBJ/OPENING SUBMARINE FORCE BILLETS TO ENLISTED WOMEN//  
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/JAN// 
 
RMKS/1. In July 2014, the Secretary of the Navy approved an integration plan to open to all women 
previously closed ratings and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes in the submarine force. This plan 
includes the opportunity for all enlisted female Sailors of ranks E-1 to E-8 and all ratings to request a 
conversion to serve in the submarine force. 
 
2. The integration of female enlisted Sailors will follow the successful integration of female officers aboard 
submarines in a similar manner. Initially, Sailors will be selected and trained for rating conversion to serve 
aboard SSGNs and SSBNs previously integrated with female officers. The first two crews will be 
integrated in 2016, with an additional two to four crews added each year through 2021. Phase two of the 




    a. E-7/8. Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) with the following ratings will be eligible to request assignment 
aboard submarines: 
IT/YN/CS/LS/HM(IDC). These CPOs will be the first enlisted women assigned to integrated crews and 
will arrive in sufficient time to fully integrate into the crew prior to junior personnel arriving. 
CPOs with these ratings will be chosen to bring their current expertise and leadership skills aboard 
submarines quickly, which will be essential in the follow-on integration of junior female Sailors. CPOs will 
be selected from these ratings for conversion and assignment in submarines until their important leadership 
role can be filled by the normal advancement process inside the submarine force. Following selection, 
CPOs will attend basic enlisted submarine school and any necessary rate-specific training prior to being 
assigned to their first submarine. Details on the application and selection process will be provided in a 
separate NAVADMIN (FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES CHIEF PETTY OFFICER 
CONVERSION PROCESS). 
    b. E-6 and below Sailors with an assigned rating. All E-6 and below female Sailors are eligible to apply 
for rating conversion into one of the following submarine ratings:  STS/FT/MMW/MT/ITS/ET-NAV/ET -
COM/LS/YN/CS/MMA. 
Each Sailor selected for conversion will attend basic enlisted submarine school followed by “A” and “C” 
schools, as needed, based on their selected rating and expertise. Details on the application and selection 
process will be provided in a separate NAVADMIN (FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES E-6 
AND BELOW RATING CONVERSION PROCESS). 
    c. New recruits and Sailors without an assigned rating. Female recruits and female Sailors who have not 
yet selected a rating are eligible to apply for training and assignment in the following 
ratings:STS/FT/MMW/MT/ITS/ET-NAV/ET-COM/LS/YN/CS/MMA/EMN/MMN/ETN/MMN-ELT. 
Following assignment, these Sailors will complete the same training pipeline as their male counterparts. 
Sailors serving in the fleet who have not yet selected a rating may apply per NAVADMIN (FY16 
ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES E-6 AND BELOW RATING CONVERSION PROCESS). 
Specific guidance for Navy Recruiters will be provided SEPCOR from Navy Recruiting Command. 
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       d. Nuclear Trained Sailors. Female Sailors in the nuclear training pipeline or serving as junior staff 
instructors at a Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) should contact their Command Career Counselors for 
details on how to apply for submarine service. Specific guidance for Navy Recruiters will be provided 
SEPCOR from Navy Recruiting Command. 
 
4. To support the integration of submarine crews, ships that will have enlisted women onboard will be 
modified to ensure conditions meet Navy guidelines for habitability and privacy while maintaining equity 
for male and female Sailors embarked in submarines. 
 
5. More information on the opportunities available and the benefits of service in the submarine force is 
available via the NPC website at http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/enlisted/community/submarine/
pages/enlistedwomeninsubmarines.aspx.This information will also be provided during visits to Navy 
homeports by  
detailers and Enlisted Community Managers (ECMs). 
    a. Non-nuclear Sailors, Command Career Counselors, and commands may also contact the submarine 
non-nuclear ECM office:  LCDR [name removed], 901–874-2082; STSCS(SS) [name removed], 901–874-
4367; YNC(SS) [name removed], 901–874-2819. 
    b. Nuclear-trained Sailors, Command Career Counselors, and commands 
may contact the nuclear ECM office:  LCDR [name removed], 703–604-5493; ETCM(SW) [name 
removed], 703–604-5492. 
 











R 211528Z JAN 15 PSN 506841H24 
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC 
TO NAVADMIN 






SUBJ/FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES CHIEF PETTY OFFICER CONVERSION// 
 
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/JAN// 
REF/A/MSG/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/211425ZJAN15// 
REF/B/DOC/BUMED/21FEB96// 
NARR/REF A IS NAVADMIN 019/15, OPENING SUBMARINE FORCE BILLETS TO ENLISTED 
WOMEN. REF B IS BUMED MANUAL FOR MEDICINE. 
 
RMKS/1. Per reference (a), the Navy’s plan to integrate enlisted women into the submarine force has been 
approved, and all submarine ratings and submarine Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes are open to 
enlisted women. 
 
2. The submarine force is seeking high caliber female Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) from the ratings listed 
below to apply for submarine service as part of this initiative. The Submarine Enlisted Community 
Manager (ECM) is accepting conversion applications for ranks E-1 through E-8. The application process 
for E-6 and below is contained in a separate NAVADMIN (FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN 
SUBMARINES E-6 AND BELOW RATING CONVERSION PROCESS). 
 
3. In an effort to identify the most qualified Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) and to ensure the success of this 
initiative, CPOS will be selected based on the following attributes: 
    a. CO’s endorsement describing the Sailor’s sustained superior performance. 
    b. Sea service experience. 
    c. Warfare qualification. 
    d. Job experience (i.e., assignments that can be related to success in future submarine service). 
 
4. In addition to sustained superior performance and future potential of the Sailor, consideration will be 
given to current overall manning of the applicant’s rating, time served at the current command, and other 
factors that may affect the command or community’s manning. 
 
5. Selected CPOs are expected to report aboard and lead a division with minimal additional technical and 
leadership training. The application process for E-7/8 in the Information Systems Technician (IT) (see note 
1 below), Logistics Specialist (LS), Culinary Specialist (CS), Yeoman (YN) (see note 2 below), and 
Independent Duty Corpsman is as follows: 
    a. All conversion CPOs, regardless of rating or rank, must meet the following minimum criteria to be 
eligible for conversion: 
        (1) Must be medically screened and suitable for duty aboard a submarine per reference (b), MANMED 
Chapter 15 (to be completed within 30 days following selection). 
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        (2) Must be a U.S. citizen already in possession of, or capable of receiving, a secret security clearance. 
        (3) No non-judicial punishments (NJP) or convictions in civilian or military courts for past 36 months. 
        (4) No marks less than ‘3.0’ on the last five evaluations. 
        (5) No PFA failures in the last three years. 
Note 1:  CPO IT conversions must have one or more of the following NECs:  2780, 2781, or 2791. 
Note 2:  CPO Personnel Specialists (PS) who have the required experience to convert to YN submarines 
may submit applications for consideration. 
    b. Active duty and Full Time Support (FTS) reserve duty CPOs must submit conversion packages 
directly to the submarine non-nuclear ECM (BUPERS-32D) for processing per para 5 below. 
    c. Each conversion package must include the following: 
        (1) Last five performance evaluations. 
        (2) PRIMS data covering the last four years of PFA information. 
        (3) NAVPERS 1306/7 signed by the CPO and the CPOs CO that clearly states the recommended 
‘earliest and latest release’ dates from the current command. 
        (4) Official statement volunteering for submarine service as outlined in MILPERSMAN 1306–402. 
        (5) COs endorsement. 
        (6) The applicant may submit (optional) a personal statement addressing her motivation for 
assignment to the submarine force. 
    d. Reserve component Sailors will submit packages per MILPERSMAN 1326–021. 
 
6. Applications must be scanned and emailed to the submarine non-nuclear ECM. Email applications to 
[name removed] (at)navy.mil, [name removed] (at)navy.mil, and [name removed] (at)navy.mil. 
    a. An example package is available on the NPC website at: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/enlisted/community/submarine/pages/
enlistedwomeninsubmarines.aspx. 
    b. Applications are due by 15 April 2015, and the selection process will begin on 16 April 2015. 
 
7. CPOs requesting conversion to submarines will be selected via a selection panel. Once final selections 
are made for E-7/8 by the submarine conversion selection panel, primary and alternate selectees will be 
notified via naval message. Alternates will be utilized in the event a selectee is found ineligible for 
conversion. 
 
8. This round of selections will apply to the women scheduled to integrate the first two submarine crews. 
Subsequent NAVADMINs announcing follow-on submarine integrations will be periodically released to 
commence future application cycles. Opportunities to reapply for assignment in submarines will be 
available at least annually. 
 
9. For questions about the application process or about submarine service, contact the submarine non-
nuclear ECM office:  LCDR [name removed],901-874-2082; STSCS(SS) [name removed], 901–874-4367; 
YNC(SS) [name removed], 901–874-2819. 
 
10. This message will remain in effect until superseded or canceled, whichever occurs first. 
 










R 211645Z JAN 15 PSN 507807H27 
FM CNO WASHINGTON DC 
TO NAVADMIN 






SUBJ/FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES E-6 AND BELOW RATING CONVERSION 
PROCESS//  
 
MSGID/GENADMIN/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/JAN// 
REF/A/MSG/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/211425ZJAN15// 
REF/B/MSG/CNO WASHINGTON DC/N1/211528ZJAN15// 
REF/C/DOC/BUMED/21FEB96// 
NARR/REF A IS NAVADMIN 019/15, OPENING SUBMARINE FORCE BILLETS TO ENLISTED 
WOMEN. REF B IS NAVADMIN 020/15, FY16 ENLISTED WOMEN IN SUBMARINES CHIEF 
PETTY OFFICER CONVERSION PROCESS. REF C IS BUMED MANUAL FOR MEDICINE. 
 
RMKS/1. Per reference (a), the Navy’s plan to integrate enlisted women into the submarine force has been 
approved, and all submarine ratings and submarine Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) codes are open to 
enlisted women. 
 
2. The submarine force is seeking high caliber female applicants from all ratings. Sailors from all 
communities are eligible to apply for submarine service as part of this initiative. Per this NAVADMIN and 
reference (b), the Submarine Enlisted Community Manager (ECM) is accepting conversion applications for 
ranks E-1 through E-8. The application process for E-7/8 is outlined in reference (b). 
 
3. Female recruits interested in submarine nuclear duty will be selected as part of the normal recruiting 
process. Female Sailors in the nuclear training pipeline or serving as junior staff instructors (JSIs) at a 
Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) should contact their Command Career Counselors for details on how 
to volunteer for submarine service. 
 
4. In an effort to identify the most qualified Sailors and to ensure the success of this initiative, Sailors will 
be selected based on the following attributes: 
    a. COs endorsement describing the Sailor’s sustained superior performance. 
    b. Sea service experience. 
    c. Warfare qualification. 
    d. Job experience (i.e., assignments that can be related to success in future submarine service) 
 
5. In addition to sustained superior performance and future potential of the Sailor, consideration will be 
given to current overall manning of the applicant’s rating, time served at the current command, and other 
factors that may affect the command or community’s manning. 
 
6. Application process for E-6 and below (non-nuclear trained personnel). 
 134 
    a. All conversion Sailors, regardless of rating or rank, must meet the following minimum criteria to be 
eligible for conversion: 
        (1) Must be medically screened and suitable for duty aboard a submarine per reference (c), MANMED 
Chapter 15 (to be completed within 30 days following selection). 
        (2) Must be a U.S. citizen already in possession of, or capable of receiving, a secret security clearance. 
        (3) Must meet ASVAB requirements for the desired rating(s) as outlined in MILPERSMAN 1306–
618. 
        (4) No non-judicial punishments (NJP) or convictions in civilian or military courts for the past 36 
months. 
        (5) No marks less than ‘3.0’ on the last five evaluations. 
        (6) No PFA failures in the last three years. 
    b. Active duty and Full Time Support (FTS) reserve duty Sailors must submit conversion packages 
directly to the submarine non-nuclear ECM (BUPERS-32D) for processing per para 7 below. Submarine 
ratings open for conversion are:  Sonar Technician (STS), Fire Control Technician (FT), Machinist Mate-
Weapons (MMW), Missile Technician (MT), Information Systems Technician (ITS) (see note 1), 
Electronics Technician -Navigation (ET-NAV), Electronics Technician-Communications (ET-COM), 
Logistics Specialist (LS), Culinary  
Specialist (CS), Yeoman (YN), and Machinist Mate-Auxiliary (MMA). Each conversion package must 
include the following: 
        (1) Last five performance evaluations.  (Sailors with minimal service may not have five evaluations 
submit as many as the Sailor has on record.) 
        (2) PRIMS data covering at least the last four years of PFA information, if available. 
        (3) ASVAB scores. 
        (4) NAVPERS 1306/7 signed by the Sailor and the Sailor’s CO identifying the Sailor’s top three 
submarine rating conversion choices and clearly stating the recommended ‘earliest and latest release’ dates 
for the current command. 
        (5) Official statement volunteering for submarine service as outlined in MILPERSMAN 1306–402. 
    c. Non-FTS reserve duty Sailors will submit packages per MILPERSMAN 1326–021. 
Note 1:  Information Systems Technician (IT) direct conversions must have one or more of the following 
NECs: 2780, 2781, or 2791. 
 
7. Applications must be scanned and emailed to the submarine non-nuclear ECM. Email applications to 
[name removed] (at)navy.mil, [name removed] (at)navy.mil, and [name removed] (at)navy.mil. 
    a. An example package is available on the NPC website at: http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/
enlisted/community/submarine/pages/enlistedwomeninsubmarines.aspx. 
    b. Applications are due by 15 April 2015, and the selection process will begin on 16 April 2015. 
 
8. Application process for E-6 and below (nuclear-trained personnel). 
The application process for E-6 and below nuclear-trained personnel will be coordinated by the individual 
Sailor’s Command Career Counselor at the NPTUs. Female JSIs or Sailors in initial training at NPTU 
interested in volunteering for submarine duty should inform their chain of command. The chain of 
command at NPTU will develop an application package on each submarine volunteer that includes the 
following: 
    a. Last five performance evaluations.  (Sailors with minimal service may not have five evaluations 
submit as many as the Sailor has on record.) 
    b. PRIMS data covering at least the last four years of PFA information, if available. 
    c. Official statement volunteering for submarine service as outlined in MILPERSMAN 1306–402. 
    d. Grades and class rank at Nuclear Field “A” school, Nuclear Power School, and NPTU. 
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    e. Written recommendation and endorsement for the Sailor from the chain of command. 
    f. For JSIs qualifications obtained at NPTU. The CO of each NPTU will forward this information, along 
with the two ranked lists (JSI ranking and initial trainee ranking) of applicants, to the nuclear ECM at 
OPNAV N133. 
 
9. Once final selections are made for E-6 and below Sailors by the ECM, selectees will be notified via 
naval message. Alternates will be utilized in the event that a selectee is found ineligible for conversion. 
 
10. This round of selections will apply to the women scheduled to integrate the first two submarine crews. 
Subsequent NAVADMINs announcing follow-on submarine integrations will be periodically released to 
commence future application cycles. Opportunities to reapply for assignment in submarines will be 
available at least annually. 
 
11. For questions about the application process or about submarine service, contact the submarine non-
nuclear ECM office:  LCDR [name removed], 901–874- 
2082; STSCS(SS) [name removed], 901–874-4367;YNC(SS) [name removed], 901–874-2819. Nuclear-
trained Sailors may contact the nuclear ECM office:  LCDR [name removed], 703–604-5493; ETCM(SW) 
[name removed], 703–604-5492. 
 
12. This message will remain in effect until superseded or canceled, whichever occurs first. 
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APPENDIX D.  INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Introduction 
We are interested in capturing the complete story of your experience as one of the first 
female submariners. We are interested in hearing your narrative and opinions from your 
individual perspective. We would like to hear of your motivations, experiences, thoughts, 
perceptions and musings—if it was interesting, amusing, confusing, touching or 
frustrating—we would like to hear the story.  
 
Thus, we will ask you to tell us your story and to share specific examples. We have 
prepared questions to help draw out your story, but please feel free to tell us in whatever 
order or pace makes sense to you.  
 
Background 
• Please tell us (the story of) how you came to join the Navy? 
• Did you intend the Navy as full career or single term decision? 
• Undergraduate degree? 
 
Initial Considerations 




• What specific experiences contributed to your interest? How?  
• How did other people inspire your decision? What was their role in your 
life (in other words, who were they, without giving us names)? 
• Describe your interactions or experiences with other submariners that 
might have influenced your interest. 
 
Expectations 
• Before the assignment, what was your perception of the Submarine Force in 
general? 
• What excited you about the prospect?  
• What worried you about the prospect? 
• What impacts did you want to make initially? 
• Did you expect to be treated differently? If so, how? 
• How did you expect the assignment to impact your life and career? 
• Work-life balance? Advancement? Socially? 
• How did you expect to manage any conflicts?  
 
Prior to Arrival on Boat 
Tell us the story of your experience prior to arrival on the boat; begin with how you were 





• How were you selected to the program? 
• Solicited? Volunteered? 
• Approval process? 
• What was your experience of training? What happened? 
• What unexpected requirements or experiences developed based on the new 
gender? 
• Other organization’s preparations? 
• Paperwork you expected/didn’t expect 
• Inputs you had to give? 
• Please tell us a story of an event or organization/person that was particularly 
assistive. 
• Please tell us a story of an event or organization/person that was combative.  
 
Reporting Onboard 
• Tell me about your first experiences upon reporting to your first submarine. 
• Culture includes assumptions about they way things are done, how people should 
interact and what is important, We often see culture through behaviors and also 
symbols that are displayed and the stories people tell. Describe the culture of the 
submarine when you first arrived. 
• What barriers or challenges did you face initially and how did you deal with 
them?  
• Possible probes 
• Initially, what types of accommodation did people make, if any? 
• Was there a “warming up” period? Blatant opposition or acceptance? 
 
Remainder of Assignment 
• After you initial arrival, tell us about the significant milestones of your 
experience. What events stick in your memory? 
• What significant roles did you address or fill as a crewmember? 
• What people or events most influenced your experience? How? 
• What conflicts existed? What were the keys to overcoming those conflicts? 
• Tell us about any awkward, touching or learning experiences. What people or 
events played a role? 
 
Personal Experiences 
• How did your experience compare with your expectations? What was as expected, 
what was different? 
• How did your perspective about the assignment and/or behavior change over 
time? What events or people influenced this change? 
• How has this experience influenced you? (career and life) 
• What would you have done or thought differently, given what you know now? 





• What resources or policies best supported your experience and integration? 
• How did leaders or the organizations you worked for support your 
integration? 
• What hindered your integration?   
• What benefits do you attribute to integration?   
• Do you have any suggestions on how the Navy could improve the recruitment and 
training process for you? 
• Was it adequate? 
• Did it prepare you? 
• Was there anything that would have been helpful to add? Change? 
• Any integration oriented training? 
 
• What suggestions do you have for how the Navy could improve the work 
experience for you? 
 
Administrative/Demographic Questions: 
• What is your marital status? 
• How long have you been in the Navy? 
• What is your rank? Or specialty? Assignments on board? 
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APPENDIX E.  AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
A. LCDR KRYSTEN J. ELLIS, SC, USN 
LCDR Krysten J. Ellis was born in Knoxville, TN. She graduated from Auburn 
University in 2003 with a Bachelors of Civil Engineering (Suma Cum Laude). Her first 
tour was as an instructor at Nuclear Power School in August 2003, teaching Enlisted 
Reactor Principles and Mathematics, as well as running the Multimedia training division. 
After her lateral transfer and graduation from Navy Supply Corps School in August 2007, 
she reported to USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) as the Sales Officer. Bonhomme 
Richard conducted a Western Pacific deployment, Rim of the Pacific joint exercise, 
INSURV and Supply Management Inspection.  
In February 2009, LCDR Ellis reported to the forward deployed logistics ship, 
USNS Richard E. Byrd (T-AKE 4), serving as the Assistant Officer in Charge and the 
Operations Officer. During her tour, the ship successfully completed Pacific Partnership 
2009 in the South Pacific and provided fuel, ammo and stores logistical support to C7F 
operating vessels, including multiple ESGs/BSGs. In March 2010, she reported to Special 
Boat Team 20 as the Supply Officer, where she excelled as the Budget Officer, 
supporting special operations in support of USCENTCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, 
USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM. In November 2011, LCDR Ellis 
reported as Supply Officer of USS Georgia Gold (SSGN 729) in Kings Bay, Georgia, 
which conducted, Find, Fix and Finish operations as part of a Joint Task Force. After 
qualifying in submarines in April 2013, she reported as Supply Officer of USS Wyoming 
Gold (SSBN 742), to fulfill a gapped billet in support of the Women in Submarines 
initiative. Wyoming conducted one patrol during her tenure. 
  In November 2013, LCDR Ellis reported to Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, CA, to study Contract and Acquisition Management. She resides in Monterey, 
CA. Her personal awards include three Navy Commendation medals and two Navy and 
Marine Corps Achievement medals. 
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B. LT GAROLD I. MUNSON, USN 
LT Munson was born in Peoria, Illinois, in April of 1980. Shortly after, his family 
moved to the small mountain town of Georgetown, Colorado where he lived until 
enlisting in the Navy in the summer of 2000. Following completion of the Sonar 
Technician training pipeline in 2001, he moved to Washington State and reported aboard 
his first submarine, USS Michigan (SSBN 727). Garold served as a member of the sonar 
division and, after attaining the rank of First Class Petty Officer, as the Lead Petty 
Officer of the Centralized Work Control Team during the Engineering Refueling 
Overhaul and SSGN conversion of the Michigan. During his time in the shipyard, he also 
served aboard USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) as a Sonar Supervisor in support of an 
undermanned sonar division. In 2005, he applied and was accepted into the Seaman to 
Admiral enlisted to officer accession program and transferred in 2006 to commence full 
time undergraduate study at the University of Colorado Boulder. 
LT Munson graduated with honors in December 2008 with a BA in economics 
and was commissioned as a submarine designated line officer. Following completion of 
Navy nuclear training school and the Submarine Basic Officer Course he again traveled 
to Washington and reported to USS Nevada SSBN 733 as a division officer. On Nevada, 
LT Munson served as the Reactor Controls Officer, Tactical Systems Officer, and 
assistant Engineer. During his division officer tour, LT Munson was awarded two Navy 
and Marine Corps Achievement Medals, the Navy Commendation Medal, and was 
selected as the Submarine Squadron 17 Junior Officer of the Year for 2013. 
In November 2013, LT Munson transferred from Nevada and reported to the 
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, to begin graduate study in the MBA 
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